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O Colapso do "Joga Bonito": How
FIFA's Banishment of Third-Party
Ownership Runs Counter to
European Union Law and Has
Tarnished the Once Beautiful
Game
BrendanA. Bailey
ABSTRACT

FIFA banned the practice of third-party ownership, the
division and sale of a portion of a football player's economic
rights to an outside investor, in 2015. The ban was
nondiscriminatory,applying to all types of third-partyownership
utilized throughout football. Since then, the practice has all but
disappearedinternationally,with FIFA quashing occurrences of
the practice through large fines and other forms of punishment.
FIFA's move to ban the practice came shortly after pressurefrom
leagues that banned it years before-principally the English
Premier League, one of the most influential leagues in Europe.
However, such a ban was largely propped upon a report
completed by the International Centre for Sports Studies that
provided questionable conclusions. The disclaimers provided
alongside the conclusions of the reportwould lead any reasonable
person to conduct further research on the subject before
institutingsuch an aggressive ban.
FIFA's ban runs counter to European Union law, butting
against decisions from the Court of Justice of the European
Union, European Union articles and agreements, and even
certain countries'independentlegal codes. This Note hopes to pull
the wool away from football supporters' eyes and perhaps
mobilize a group of legally conscious scholars to bring action
against FIFA to force compliance with EU law. Beyond that, this
Note proposes a new regulatory regime to replaceFIFA's complete
ban. Such regime would permit one type of third-party ownership
(financing TPOs, used primarily by clubs with struggling
balance sheets) that would fully comply with EU law and likely
receive deference from EU entities due to FIFA's stance as an
expert within its market sphere.

179

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

180

[VOL. 52:179

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

INTRODUCTION

.....................................

II.

BACKGROUND

..........................................

A.

B.

.............
History of Player Ownership.........
1. Overview of the Normal Transfer ...........
2. The Transfer Process Including TPO...........
.........
ParsingThrough the Intricaciesof TPO.
1. Economic v. Federative Rights.............
2. Types of TPO Transactions....... .........
League Responses to TPO Arrangements .........
1. Leagues Banning TPO ...........
..........
a. English Football Association
English Premier League ............
b. Polish Football Association ..........
2. Leagues Permitting TPO ........
..........
..................
a. Spain & Portugal
b. Eastern Europe & South America....
3. FIFA-Article 18, Article 18bis, Article
18ter ...................................
a. Article 18: Special Provisions
Relating to Contracts between
Professionals and Clubs .....
.......
b. Article 18bis: Third-Party
Influence on Clubs.................
c. Article 18ter: Third-Party
Ownership of Players' Economic
Rights...............
............

184

184
184
185
187
187
189
192
193

&

C.

181

III.

ANALYSIS

.............................................

Applicability of FIFA Regulations in Relation to
Domestic League Rules
......................
B. CIES Report
..............................
C. EuropeanLaw and TPO...........
..........
1. European Union Law .....................
a. 2001 Agreement: European
Commission and FIFA/UEFA..........
b. Solidarity Mechanism......
........
c. Free Movement of Players.................
2. Court of Justice of the European Union ......
.......................
a. Bosman
b. Meca-Medina
.................
3. Country-Specific Laws Conflicting with
FIFA Regulations
........................
a. Austria
..........................
b. Brazil....
.......................
4. Article 65 of the TFEU
...................
5. Article 154 of the TFEU
...................

193
194
194
196
197
198

198
199

199
200

A.

IV.

SOLUTION

A.

.............................................

Investment and FinancingTPO Refresher ............

200
201
202
203
203
203
205
209
210
212
214
214
215
217
217
218

219

THIRD-PARTY OWNERSHIP

2019]

B.
C.
V.

Solution: A New Regulatory Structure...... ......
How this System Rectifies Current FIFA Defects..

CONCLUSION

..........................................

181

220
224
227

I. INTRODUCTION

Carlos Alberto Martinez T~vez was born in Ciudadela, Buenos
Aires on February 5, 1984.1 T~vez grew up in the ghetto of Ej6rcito de
Los Andes, an area better known as Fuerte Apache by locals, where
Thvez received the nickname "El Apache." 2 From the beginning of his
football career, Thvez was effectively constrained by red tape, facing
both league-registration and ownership-right issues.3 For example,
T6vez was forced to adopt his mother's surname as a child due to a
conflict between his two boyhood clubs, All Boys and Boca Juniors,
4
during his transfer from the former to the latter.
After staking his claim at the top of Argentinian football, T6vez
looked toward Europe for his next challenge. In 2007, Thvez made his
move to Europe, transferring to West Ham United Football Club in
London, England.5 T6vez's arrival in England was not smooth, though,
as he was immediately thrust into an investigation launched by the
English Premier League (EPL) in regards to the third-party ownership
(TPO) structure of his rights before moving to England. 6 While the
investigation continued,- Tvez played one season for West Ham, but
was ultimately told to move on and landed a contract with another EPL
club in Manchester.7
Worldwide TPO regulations conflicted with one another at the
time. Different leagues possessed different regulatory codes
safeguarding or forbidding TPO, leading to confusion when players

Biography of Carlos Tevez, ASSIGNMENT POINT, http://www.assignmentpoint
1.
.com/arts/biography/biography-of-carlos-tevez.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2018)
[https://perma.cclF42N-LX9E] (archived Nov. 2, 2018) [hereinafter Tevez Biography].
2.
Vannyhenrico, Carlos Tevez Childhood Story Plus Untold Biography Facts,
LIFE BOGGER (June 19, 2016), https://lifebogger.com/carlos-tevez-childhood-story-plusuntold-biography-facts/ [https://perma.cc/75HN-7B2K] (archived Nov. 2, 2018).
Tevez Biography, supra note 1 (discussing the difficulties Tevez has had
3.
with registration in certain football leagues and with third-party ownership issues).
4.
Id.
5.
Danny Nazareth, Flashback to 2006: Tevez and Mascherano'sshock transfer
to West Ham, SPORTSKEEDA (Oct. 28, 2015), https://www.sportskeeda.com/football/
flashback-2006-tevez-mascherano-shock-transfer-west-ham [https://perma.cclJ43KM53A] (archived Nov. 2, 2018).
6.
David Ornstein, West Ham charged over Mascheranoand Tevez deals, THE
GUARDIAN (Mar. 2, 2007), https://www.theguardian.com/football/2007/mar/03/
newsstory.sport8 [https://perma.ccfU8ZC-FUZH] (archived Nov. 2, 2018).
7.
Tevez Biography, supra note 1.
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transferred from continent to continent or country to country. 8 The
prolonged transfer sagas that plagued T~vez's career during his time
in England eventually led to changes in both EPL and F6d6ration
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) regulations regarding
TPO.9 T6vez's transfer issues serve as a cautionary tale for players
looking to enter into FIFA-regulated leagues, as FIFA has recently
promulgated
regulations
banning the
practice
of TPO.' 0
Unfortunately, some players are not aware that their rights have been
sold or that the practice is even illegal. They operate under the
assumption that if they work hard, they can play their way out of
unfortunate situations and into the most competitive leagues in the
world."
Throughout the history of the sport of football, or, as commonly
referenced in the United States, soccer, regulations of playerownership structures have remained largely untouched. Up until May
of 2015, FIFA had yet to promulgate any worldwide regulations
affecting the division of player ownership between multiple parties.12
Following increasing pressure from select major football leagues and
associations, such as the EPL and English Football Association
(English FA), FIFA decided to completely ban the practice of TPO, an
ownership scheme where an outside investor owns a percentage of a
club's player.1 3 TPO is generally defined as "the Agreement between a
Club and a Third Party ... in accordance to which, a Third Party,
whether or not in relation with an actual payment in favour of a club,
acquires an economic participation or a future credit related to the
eventual transfer of a certain football player."1 4 Many different
individuals and sources can be labeled as third parties; a few examples
are investment funds, companies, sports agencies, agents, and private
investors.15

Football provides avenues for the movement of athletes between
teams completely dissimilar to those offered by any domestic American
sports league. The velocity with which players transfer between
European football clubs stands unparalleled to any free-agency
structure that American sports have created. In the summer of 2017,

8.
DLA Piper, FIFA to ban third-partyownership of players, LEXOLOGY (Sept.
30, 2014), https://www.lexology.com/1ibrary/detail.aspx?g-441139b6-3291-4189-b642e5efe4005ebl [https://perma.cclZ6SD-HNC2] (archived Nov. 2, 2018).
9.
Tevez Biography, supra note 1.
10.
See generally KPMG, PROJECT TPO (2013), https://www.ecaeurope.com/
media/1682/tpo-report.pdf [https://perma.cclP5YK-PHXX] (archived Nov. 2, 2018).
11.
See Tevez Biography, supra note 1.
12.
Oskar van Maren et al., DebatingFIFA's TPO Ban: ASSER International
Sports Law Blog Symposium, 15 INT'L SPORTS L.J. 233, 233 (2015).
13.
Luis Villas-Boas Pires, Why the PremierLeague banned 'third-party
ownership'ofplayers, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 30, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/
football/2014/jan/30/why-premier-league-banned-third-party-ownership-players
[https://perma.cc/9YHV-76ZS] (archived Dec. 2, 2018).
14.
KPMG, supra note 10.
Id.
15.
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1,687 players transferred between teams in the top five European
football leagues, a process valued at around £4.5 billion. 16 Each league
alone accounted for an average gross transfer value of around £900
million spent on acquiring players, or USD$1.045 billion.17 Major
League Baseball (MLB), which has historically outspent the three
other major American sports leagues (the National Basketball
Association, the National Football League, and the National Hockey
League) due to their position as the only major American sports league
without a salary cap, spent only USD$1.411 billion during the 2017
MLB free-agency window, slightly above the mean average of what
each individual, top-five European league spent on transfers.1 8 Capital
expenditures of European football leagues account for a much larger
outlay of funds that dwarfs those of American sports leagues.
Unfortunately, as with any lucrative venture, this vast amount of
money can lead to corruption. FIFA has zeroed in on the entire practice
of TPO as the source of the corruption, but the statistical proof to back
up such an accusation may be lacking.19 FIFA failed to differentiate
between the different types of TPO structures that exist throughout
the football transfer market. Transfer-fee sharing is the only method
through which this article will discuss TPO, as it is the only method
banned by FIFA. Whether the corruption FIFA believes is housed
within TPO structures is systemic, or bound to only one of two
competing structures, is a question that FIFA has yet to answer.
The remainder of this Note will proceed as follows: Part II will
discuss the history of player ownership within international football,
focusing first on how the transfer process works, then progressing
through a description of TPO, its growth, and where it currently stands
today through the lens of regulatory scrutiny. Part III will provide an
analysis of FIFA's regulations banning TPO and their interaction with
European Union (EU) law, arriving at the conclusion that such
regulations are illegal on multiple fronts and that FIFA blindly wielded

16.
Marcus Christenson & Chris Fenn, Transfer window 2017-every deal in
Europe's top five leagues, THE GUARDIAN (June 22, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/football/ng-interactive/2017/jun/22/transfer-window2017-every-deal-in-europes-top-five-leagues [https://perma.cc/4VF2-L2U4] (archived
Nov. 7, 2018).
17.
This is a rough estimate, as certain leagues spent much more than others.
For example, the English Premier League spent C1.58 billion (Y1.4 billion) this past
summer alone, a new summer transfer record for the league. PremierLeague clubs
spend £1.4bn to break summer transfer record, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 1, 2017),

https://www.theguardian.com/football/2017/sep/01/transfer-window-deadline-dayrecord-spend [https://perma.ccl7HHF-6WXZ] (archived Nov. 2, 2018).
2017 Spending by Team, SPOTRAC, https://www.spotrac.comlmlb/tools/
18.
offseason/2017/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2018).
19.

See INT'L CTR. FOR SPORTS STUDIES, THIRD-PARTY OWNERSHIP OF PLAYERS'

ECONOMIC RIGHTS 4 (2013), http://old.futbalsfz.sk/fileadmin/user-upload/Legislatival
Medzinarodne-institucie/20140512_Third-party-Ownership-ofPlayersEconomic
Rights_0l.pdf [https://perma.cclWHG5-Y6G2] (archived Nov. 2, 2018) [hereinafter
CIES REPORT] (discussing how securing reliable information to complete the study was
impossible to obtain in order to correctly estimate TPO's global significance).
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its power. Finally, Part IV will reimagine a suitable legal solution to
regulate TPO that would not only comply with EU law but also permit
FIFA to ban the features of TPO it finds unsuitable. Part V will contain
a brief conclusion of the topic and recap the solution proposed.
II. BACKGROUND

A. History of Player Ownership
1. Overview of the Normal Transfer
In every European football league, players are permitted to move
from one team to another, biannually, in a period known as the transfer
window.20 Players change teams on a regular basis, similar to stocks
traded on the open stock market, but with limited regulation and
oversight beyond a standard set of rules promulgated by individual
leagues. 21 This lack of uniformity in league rules has led to different
forms of ownership throughout the world, with neighboring countries
sometimes having completely disparate regulatory schemes. 22
Ultimately, many transfers have stalled due to these different leagues
creating and enforcing sets of rules that do not align with one
another. 2 3
The transfer window is open twice within a twelve-month period;
the summer transfer window is open for just under three months,
running from early June through the end of August, and the winter
transfer window is open only in the month of January. 24 Exact opening
and closing dates vary country by country and league by league, but
for the most part, the preceding dates are followed by the majority of
leagues and nations.25
Normal transfers of footballers operate as common buy-sell
transactions. Surprisingly, most negotiations take place through
WhatsApp, a mobile phone application. 2 6 A typical transfer is
conducted as follows: team A offers, or bids, a specific amount of money

20.
How a football transfer works, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 7, 2017),
https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2017/08/economist-explains-4
[https://perma.ce/QHG5-998X] (archived Nov. 2, 2018) [hereinafter Football Transfer].
21.
See THE FOOTBALL AsS'N PREMIER LEAGUE LTD., PREMIER LEAGUE
HANDBOOK SEASON 2017/18 at 217 (2017) [hereinafter PL HANDBOOK].
22.
See CIES REPORT, supra note 19, at 3 (discussing the differences in thirdparty ownership rules in leagues and countries throughout the world, and providing
results of a FIFA-commissioned study focusing on the viability of third-party
ownership).
23.
Id.
24.
Jack Wilkinson, When does the transfer window open? When does it close?,
SKY SPORTS (updated Aug. 6, 2017), https://www.skysports.com/football/news/
12691/10862752/when-does-the-transfer-window-open [https://perma.cclX7BE-UENF]
(archived Nov. 2, 2018).
25.
Id.
26.
Football Transfer, supra note 20.
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to team B for one of its players, which then accepts or rejects the bid.
Depending on the terms of the player's contract, a release clause may
be an express term within the contract. 27 If the value listed in the
player's contractual release clause is met by the bidding team, a virtual
trigger is flipped and the owning team must permit the player to
complete a transfer to the bidding team in exchange for the stated
release clause value. If a team bidding for a player meets or exceeds
the contractually agreed-upon release clause, the owners of the player's
contract are required to accept the sum and allow the player to transfer
teams.2 8 Alternatively, both sides may come to a fee agreement if no
release clause term is contained in the contract or if they waive the
release clause. Generally, while team A and team B discuss a fee for
the player, team A also negotiates a contract with the player. If all
sides come to an agreement, the transfer proceeds, and the player has
a new home.
This is a very straightforward process when the player is 100
percent owned by team B. But recent trends in smaller leagues
throughout the world toward new forms of ownership have thrown a
wrench into this simple process. 29
2. The Transfer Process Including TPO
With such exorbitant fees paid by teams, and the prices of talented
players continuing to increase as television revenues and sponsorship
contracts have fattened, third parties have begun to look at football
transfers as an investment tool.30 TPO within international football is
a recent strategical advent used by owners to subsidize the costs of
running a football organization. TPO is "a financial instrument whose
origins go back to South American countries but that, in the last few
years, have undergone strong expansion within the European football
scenario."3 1 TPO is an investment, by a third-party source, "in the
professional players' economic rights." 32 A player's rights can be
broken into both federative and economic rights: federative rights,
which cannot be sold to a third party on any occasion, refer to a player's

27.
Id.
28.
Id.
29.
See Gabriele Marcotti, The challenge FIFA faces regardingthird-party
ownership, ESPN (Mar. 30, 2016), http://www.espnfe.com/blog/marcotti-musings/62/
post/2840253/the-challenge-fifa-faces-regarding-third-party-ownership
[https://perma.cc/3H4R-TQEC] (archived Nov. 4, 2018).
30.
Football Transfer, supra note 20; see also Jonathan Blumberg, What
Neymar's record-breaking$263 million transfer fee means for the future of soccer,
CNBC (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/17/what-neymars-263-milliontransfer-fee-means-for-the-future-of-soccer.html [https://perma.cc/2JJA-3RKZ]
(archived Nov. 4, 2018).
Rosa Lombardi et al., Third Party Ownership in the Field of Professional
31.
Football:A CriticalPerspective, 3 BUS. SYS. REV. 32, 34 (2014).
ToMAS MERCES DE MELLO MOURAO-FERREIRA, TILBURG UNIV., THIRD-PARTY
32.
OWNERSHIP OF PLAYERS' EcoNoMic RIGHTS 4 (2016) [hereinafter MOuRAO-FERREIRA].
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ability to be registered within the football association their team is
member to; economic rights pertain to the player's owner's rights to
profits if a player is sold-on (sold to a different team) after their
investment.33 International response to such ownership styles has
ranged from acceptance to staunch disdain, with many influential
leagues banning the practice and forcing teams to buy out the thirdparty owner prior to a player completing a transfer into the league. 34
FIFA has taken a strong stand against TPO in both its public
statements and regulations, stating that "TPO has harmful effects on
football and its essential values, thereby undermining the overall
integrity of the game."3 5 FIFA banned the practice of TPO on May 1,
2015 by introducing and adopting Article 18ter. 3 6 Prior to adopting
such regulation, FIFA commissioned the International Centre for
Sports Studies (CIES) to create a report on the status of TPO in FIFA's
member associations at a worldwide level.3 7 The report discussed the
scale of TPO worldwide and the current status of TPO permissions in
football associations worldwide, and also provided comments and
suggestions from member associations. 38 Ultimately, the CIES
concluded that (1) many associations were not concerned about TPO,
(2) those concerned with TPO issues had taken action on their own
accord to ban the practice within their league, and (3) reliable
information for the study to rely upon was difficult to find and it was
thus impossible to estimate the global significance of TPO at the
time.39 Despite this lack of concrete evidence, FIFA found the
conclusions provided by the CIES report sufficient to ban TPO
worldwide. 40 A portion of this Note will discuss the issue relating to the
inconclusive sources, which either reference tainted data or do not
raise an inference that TPO must be eliminated, that FIFA purportedly
41
relied upon in making its decision to ban TPO.
TPO is a tactic employed heavily by teams in South America and
smaller leagues scattered throughout Europe. 4 2 These teams struggle
to pay for players' room and board, training time, and travel expenses;

See id.
33.
34.
See CIES REPORT, supra note 19, at 3.
35.
Bill Wilson, Football's third-partyownership rule explained, BBC NEWS
(Sept. 27, 2016), http://www.bbc.comlnews/business-37483203 [https://perma.cc/C55M9RGL] (archived Nov. 4, 2018).
36.
Van Maren et al., supra note 12, at 233.
37.
CIES REPORT, supra note 19, at 2.
38.
Id. at 2-4.
Id. at 4.
39.
See id.
40.
41.
See id. (listing the conclusions from the extensive study, with recognitions
that "many associations do not feel concerned by the TPO issue," that "reliable
information on the scale of the phenomenon is rare," and that it is "therefore
impossible for the time being to estimate its global significance.") It is not totally
unsurprising that a corrupt organization would take such findings as material and
institute a rule completely in favor of large, powerful, rich football associations.
42.
Lombardi et al., supra note 31, at 34.
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to subsidize these costs, an outside investor (third party) pays for a
player's expenses, and in return receives a percentage of the player's
sell-on transfer fee, helping to keep "lower division clubs afloat." 43 In
essence, the third party is given a specific percentage of ownership in
the player. In some cases, this split in ownership causes transfers to
stall, because the third-party owner acts stubbornly throughout
negotiations and demands higher transfer-fee payouts or precludes a
transfer entirely because the league of destination bans the practice of
TPO.
Ultimately, in order for any new TPO-permitted regime to
succeed, the third-party owner must be a "silent party." A silent party
is a party that does not take part in any personnel, training, or
administrative decisions regarding the player. The silent party is the
equivalent of a shareholder in a company traded on the New York
Stock Exchange; they own a specific percentage of stock but have no
actual stake in the day-to-day decisions regarding the company, or in
this case, the player. This Note purports to cultivate and provide a
potential regulatory regime that could one day persuade FIFA to
permit the practice of TPO, for the good of joga bonito.44
B. Parsingthrough the Intricaciesof TPO
1. Economic v. Federative Rights
As previously stated, a player's rights can be broken into both
federative and economic rights. 45 This division brought the possibility
of TPO to life and permitted outside investors to enter into ownership
46
schemes that would not be feasible with a single-owner rights regime.
The greatest differentiating factor between the two sets of rights is that
economic rights tend to be transferable and divisible, while federative
47
rights are prohibited from division and must be owned by the club.
Federative rights only "move" when a player is transferred to a new
club, as is required by domestic league rules.
Federative rights are the rights of a "sports entity to register a
player in a specific official competition organized by a federation or an
association." 4 8 These rights permit the player to actually participate or

Marcotti, supra note 29.
43.
See Barney Corkhill, Jogo Bonito: "The Beautiful Game", BLEACHER REP.
44.
(Oct. 16, 2008), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/69649-jogo-bonito-the-beautiful-game
[https://perma.cc/EJ36-3YKG] (archived Nov. 4, 2018).
45.

MOuRAo-FERREIRA, supra note 32, at 4.

W. Tyler Hall, After the Ban: The FinancialLandscape of International
46.
Soccer After Third-PartyOwnership, 94 OR. L. REV. 179, 184 (2015).
See id.
47.
Javier Canosa, Federativeand Economic Rights in ProfessionalFootball, IR
48.
GLOBAL (Jan. 18, 2012), https://www.irglobal.com/article/federative-and-economicrights-in-professional-football-1330 [https://perma.cc/8HSQ-H7UT] (archived Nov. 4,
2018).
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play for the club, and are commonly referred to as the right of transfer
or, more formally, registration rights.4 9 These rights provide a club
with a number of benefits: the rights to register a player with the
national organization; to recognize, train, and use the player as part of
the club's squad during league and international competitions; to use
the image of the player to promote the club; to loan the player to other
clubs throughout the world at a period set by the loaning club and
agreed to by the loanee club; and the ultimate right to transfer, or sell,
the player to another club anywhere in the world.5 0 That being said,
federative rights always remain solely owned by the club and are only
permitted to be owned by the club; a third-party owner can never own
any percentage of a player's federative rights."1 A third-party owner's
rights can only be realized or attained through the purchase of a
player's economic rights.
For the purposes of this Note, economic rights will be discussed in
reference to a third-party owner's right to profits if a player is sold-on
after their initial investment. To recap, economic rights stand as the
percentage ownership that a third-party owner purchased as an
investment in a specific player. Economic rights are "the rights to
receive proceeds from the sale of a [player's] Federative right." 52
Economic rights can be divided between multiple parties or ownership
entities. 5 3 Economic rights make the entire TPO process possible,
creating the opportunity for a player's money-making rights to be
sold. 54

Upon the signing of a contract for employment with a club, both
sets of rights are activated, permitting the division of rights that makes
TPO feasible.5 5 The player is essentially signing his exclusive
federative rights over to the club in return for a spot on the roster and
a salary. This provides the player access to whatever league he is
seeking to join, since the club itself is the exclusive entity permitted to
register players into leagues. Economic rights are merely the
byproduct of this contractual relationship between player and club.
Federative rights, in a way, create economic rights, thus economic
rights should be considered as derivative of federative rights.5 6 This
division is logical, as without federative rights a player would be

49.
Id.; Sarah Ochwada, CAN I OWNA FOOTBALL PLAYER?-Third Party
Ownership in a nutshell, SNOLEGAL (July 11, 2013), https://snolegal.wordpress.
com/category/football/professional-football/federative-rights [https://perma.cc/4DKVWTKS] (archived Nov. 4, 2018).
50.
Id.
51.
MOURAO-FERREIRA, supra note 32, at 4.
52.
Ochwada, supra note 49.
53.
Hall, supra note 46, at 184.
54.
See Ochwada, supra note 49 (discussing the importance of economic rights
to the TPO process).
55.
Id.
56.
Canosa, supra note 48.
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valueless, since the player would not be permitted to actually register
with the league or play in any competition. 57
The recent realization of a player's divisible rights led to the rise
of TPO, an issue that sat largely dormant until the 2000s, when
leagues such as the EPL and the Portuguese Primeira Liga began to
bicker over its merits and values. 5 8 By implementing TPO regimes,
certain clubs could acquire players they would not have been able to
afford otherwise.5 9 Additionally, the use of TPO allowed clubs to
mitigate the costs of a failed investment in a player by spreading the
cost to an external entity.6 0 League responses to the widespread use of
TPO were varied, with certain powerful leagues lobbying FIFA, the
world's most powerful football entity, to ban the practice.
2. Types of TPO Transactions
While the simple division between federative and economic rights
permits TPO to occur in theory, different forms of TPO transactions
have sprouted up that benefit specific regions and leagues. 61 At the
forefront of the sophisticated TPO market are two similar yet
distinctive TPO methods: financing TPOs and investment TPOs. 62
While other methods of TPO transactions are employed throughout
Europe, such as the use of economic rights as guarantees or
commissions linked to the sale value of a player, no method has risen
63
to quite the same prominence as the financing or investment TPOs.
The main difference in these TPO vehicles, which FIFA has
refused to address, is that financing-TPO transactions are employed to
supplement a specific financial need of a club (such as paying for player
transportation to away matches), while investment-TPO transactions
take place when a club is satisfying a want (by buying a new player),
not necessarily satisfying a fiscal need. 64
Financing TPOs involve the "sale of part of the economic rights of
specific players, for which the club receives an agreed amount." 65 A
financing TPO operates similarly to a small business loan, except the
consideration exchanged in return for the loan is the economic rights

57.
See id.
58.
Rob Hemingway, La Liga's relationship with South America, FOOTBALL
ESPANA (Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.football-espana.net/66753/1a-ligas-relationshipsouth-america [https://perma.cc/JED9-WZ7J] (archived Nov. 4, 2018); What is thirdparty ownership in football and why is it controversial?,THE TELEGRAPH (Sept. 26,
2016), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/09/26/what-is-third-party-ownership-infootball-and-why-is-it-controve/ [https://perma.cc/KH7Z-J86K] (archived Nov. 4, 2018)
[hereinafter What is third-party ownership].
Hall, supra note 46, at 185.
59.
60.
Id.
61.
See id.
62.
Id.
63.
See id.
64.
Id.
65.
KPMG, supra note 10, at 5.
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of one or several players. 66 This type of TPO transaction benefits "clubs
in need of economic liquidity to balance their accounts, and to be able
to cover external or internal mandatory expenses." 67 The percentage of
economic rights received by a financing-TPO investor ranges from 10
percent to 40 percent, avoiding the potential sale of a majority of a
player's economic rights to a third party.6 8 This limit is meant to
prevent a financing-TPO transaction from exerting any external or
dominant influence over the club's decisions, allowing the club to repair
its financial and liquidity stability.6 9 In essence, when a club is
struggling to make ends meet, the financing TPO serves as a bridge
loan to assist the organization in rehabilitating its balance sheet and
arriving at sustained financial success. The loan exchanges temporary
assets-the economic rights of players-and disappears once the
player moves to another team. The monetary value due to the outside
loaning entity is paid from the sum received in exchange for the player
they possessed economic rights to, and the relationship as to that loan
70
terminates at that point in time.
Investment TPOs are the most common type of TPO transaction
in the world of football, represented by the "acquisition of a player by
a club, and simultaneously part of the economic rights of the player are
acquired by a third party."7 1 Investment-TPO transactions occur
"when a club is interested in signing a player whose federative rights
are owned by another club, but does not have the financial resources
to pay the transfer fee."7 2 This transaction method utilizes a third
party to finance the purchase of a specific player. The transaction is
not one of necessity, but one of excess. The third-party investor enters
into a TPO agreement with the club and provides a portion of the
transfer-fee payment for a new player.7 3 In return, the third-party
investor receives a percentage of the purchased player's economic
rights, finding profit in the future transfer of the player just
purchased. 74 The third-party investor, now third-party owner, shares
the player's economic rights with the purchasing football club.7 6
Notably, the auditing company KPMG discovered that, after
conducting a thorough case study of TPO throughout Europe, the

66.
Id. at 13.
67.
Id.
68.
See id. If the normal range is less than 50 percent, a player's rights are
never held as a majority stake by a third party owner. Id.
69.
See id. The goal of the financing-TPO is to help strengthen the financial
solvency of a club performing poorly, and by keeping the percentage sold of a player
below a majority stake helps keep the decision making "in house" with the football
club. Id.
70.
See id. Assuming there are no other terms to the sale of a player's rights
under the financing-TPO, the relationship will change once that player is sold. Id.
71.
Id. at 5.
72.
Id. at 13.
73.
Id.
74.
Id.
75.
Id.
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football club "has a duty of transparency and of good faith to the
investor," and that the club could possibly be "obliged" to transfer the
player when an offer is made for the player, "pursuant to the terms and
conditions set out in the TPO agreement." 76 Investment-TPO
agreements can range from 10 percent to 50 percent of the purchased
player's economic rights; common practice is for a third party to not
own a majority interest in those rights."
Investment TPOs appear to possess many of the qualities that
FIFA looked to eliminate by banning TPO worldwide.7 8 While the
financing TPO looks to prolong the established football club at its roots,
the investment-TPO method could lead to external influences forcing
the untimely departure of a player.79 The financing-TPO approach
looks to assist struggling clubs by providing them large sums of money
in exchange for an existing player's economic rights.80 Thus, the
interests of the third party are different from those of the investment
TPO. The financing TPO looks to avoid such external influences by
limiting the total percentage that a TPO commonly owns and offering
different initial incentives for the investment.8 1 The goal is not to profit
from the potential boon in sell-on value of the player, but to rehabilitate
the club and earn a return on investment from improved club
operations and results.8 2
FIFA seems to have only been targeting investment-TPO
transactions through its implementation of Article 18.83 FIFA was
attempting to eliminate external influences from affecting the
personnel decisions of a football club through this set of regulations. 84
FIFA's main intention in implementing Article 18 was to communicate
to clubs that it wanted all football-related decisions to be made by club
personnel themselves-not by third parties focused on purely financial
intuitions.8 5 FIFA failed to thoroughly investigate and differentiate

76.
Id.
Id.
77.
See id. Qualities such as third-party owner influence over transactions can
78.
arise with investment-TPOs because the third party may own up to 50 percent of a
player, owning an equal interest as the football club, permitting the third-party owner
to have an equal say in decision making. Id.
79.
See id.
Id.
80.
81.
Id.
Id.
82.
83.

See FIFA, REGULATIONS ON THE STATUS AND TRANSFER OF PLAYERS 19-21

(2016), https://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/02/70/95/
52/regulationsonthestatusandtransferofplayersjune2016_e-neutral.pdf [https://perma
.cc/3G8V-CB3D] (archived Nov. 4, 2018) [hereinafter FIFA REGULATIONS]. This belief
can be seen through FIFA's repeated comments that it does not want any outside

influences to affect transfer negotiations or have such outside interests lead a club to
be forced to sell a player. Id.
Id.
84.
85.
See id. (showing that repeated comments by FIFA seem to demonstrate fear
that the decision-making power can be taken from a club); KPMG, supra note 10, at 13

192

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOt. 52:179

between the different TPO vehicles in Article 18. A full cost-benefit
analysis would have led the governing body to discover that clubs in
dire need of financial assistance can be protected through the use of
financing TPOs. 8 6 Unfortunately, FIFA never explicitly stated which
type of TPO it meant to target through the implementation of Article
18.87 As discussed below, FIFA's regulations directly forbid TPO by
explicitly banning the transfer of a player's economic rights through
Articles 18, 18bis, and 18ter.88 FIFA never differentiated between the
many different types of TPO in existence, and instituted a blanket ban
of the practice by targeting the sale of a player's economic rights
instead.8 9
C. League Responses to TPO Arrangements
The division of economic and federative rights has created tension
during transfer negotiations, as the third party is an unaffiliated party
that must be negotiated with or paid off.90 Based on these
complications, teams sometimes forego certain transfers completely,
and leagues have banned the practice to avoid the corruption of outside
influencers on transfers.9 1 FIFA banned the practice of TPO through
the introduction of Article 18ter into the FIFA regulations on May 1,
2015.92 Shortly before FIFA's ban, the English FA, EPL, and Polish
Football Association (Polish FA) each enacted similar bans. While
certain leagues banned the practices, others continued to prop up the
system; Spain's La Liga and Portugal's Primeira Liga continued the
practice, while leagues throughout Eastern Europe and South America
also embraced the practice until FIFA's complete ban. The complete
disarray of regulatory stances throughout individual domestic leagues
worldwide caused confusion for FIFA and its members, leading FIFA
to rush into a regulatory stance on the subject that was overly harsh
and critical of those employing the practice.

(explaining that investment-TPOs are those that permit an outside third party to
potentially take decision making power away from a football club).
86.
See KPMG, supranote 10, at 13 (noting that financing-TPOs provide many
benefits to a club, especially those clubs struggling to make ends meet, by permitting
them to sell a player they currently own and to reinvest in their future).
87.
See infra Part II.C.3. None of FIFA's articles explicitly mention a specific
type of third-party ownership, as their only comments pertain to the entirety of the
practice and not to specific subsets. Id.
88.
See FIFA REGULATIONS, supra note 83, at 19-21; infra Part III.A.
89.
See FIFA REGULATIONS supra note 83, at 19-21 (explaining that FIFA never
explicitly determines or mentions which types of third-party ownership structures it is
worried about, instead creating a blanket ban on the entire practice).
90.
See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the difference between federative and
economic rights).
91.
See FIFA REGULATIONS, supra note 83, at 19-21; PL HANDBOOK, supra note
21, at 214.
92.
Van Maren et al., supra note 12, at 233.
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1. Leagues Banning TPO
a. English Football Association & English PremierLeague
Although FIFA passed expansive regulations banning the practice
of TPO in 2015, major influences within world football banned the
practice more than seven years earlier: the English FA and the EPL.9 3
In 2008, the English FA became the first entity to ban the practice of
TPO. 94 The English FA stands as the regulatory body of English
football at all levels, and serves as a member of FIFA.9 5 The English
FA was the only major footballing association to ban the practice prior
96
to FIFA's blanket, worldwide ban.

The English FA's ban was not without provocation, as a singular
TPO controversy within the league led to TPO's ultimate banishment
throughout England and Wales.9 7 The 2006 purchases of the economic

rights of Carlos Thvez, discussed earlier, and Javier Mascherano by
two offshore companies (third parties) and West Ham United Football
Club led to a revelation throughout England that a player's rights were
divisible.9 8 Until then, the practice had not spread into England,
although it was common throughout Eastern Europe, Portugal, and
Spain, and widespread throughout South America.9 9 Upon this
discovery, the EPL charged West Ham with violating two regulations,
U6 and U18, both of which "forbid third-party player ownership from
potentially influencing events at the destination club."10 0 Regulation
U6 provides that "no person may either directly or indirectly be
involved in or have any power to determine or influence the
management or administration of more than one club."1 0 ' Regulation
U18 provides that "no club shall enter into a contract which enables
any other party to that contract to require the ability materially to
influence its policies or the performance of its teams in league
matches."10 2

Villas-Boas Pires, supra note 13.
93.
94.
Fred Nathan, Sam Allardyce: What is third-party ownership in football and
why is it so controversial?, THE SUN (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.thesun.co.uk/sport/
1860888/sam-allardyce-what-is-third-party-ownership-in-football-and-why-is-it-socontroversial/ [https://perma.cc/FKD4-BTAY] (archived Nov. 4, 2018).
Competitions, THE FA, http://www.thefa.com/competitions (last visited Nov.
95.
7, 2018) [https://perma.cc/94YW-KMCE] (archived Nov. 4, 2018); England, THE FA,
http://www.thefa.com/england (last visited Nov. 7, 2018) [https://perma.ce/2RS4-NT45]
(archived Nov. 4, 2018).
96.
FIFA to ban thirdparties owning transfer rights, FOX SPORTS (Sept. 26,
2014), https://www.foxsports.com/soccer/story/fifa-votes-to-ban-third-party-ownershipof-transfer-rights-092614 [https://perma.cc/RKM5-CNL2] (archived Nov. 4, 2018).
97.
Villas-Boas Pires, supra note 13.
98.
Id.
99.
Id.
100. Ornstein, supra note 6.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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The EPL believed that West Ham's signings of T6vez and
Mascherano were tied to separate agreements with the individual
players' representatives. 0 3 The EPL stated that such agreements
contained provisions allowing the representatives to "determine such
factors as when the players were sold and when they were played." 0 4
If such allegations were true, the players would be ineligible to play
within the EPL or in other competitions for West Ham.1 05 Ultimately,
the EPL severely punished West Ham, finding the allegations true and
fining the club £5.5 million for failure to disclose necessary documents
related to the Thvez and Mascherano signings. 0 6
Whether or not the transfers of T6vez and Mascherano were
tainted by traces of TPO, the future of TPO within England was sown:
TPO continued to be vehemently restricted by the EPL, and if clubs
were caught engaging in the practice, they faced a reduction in points,
altering their position on the league table, or other fines if deemed
necessary by the EPL. 0 7
b. Polish Football Association
Around the time the English FA and EPL banned TPO, the Polish
FA also banned the practice. 0 8 Article 33.4, the vehicle used by the
Polish FA to ban TPO practices in Polish football, "states that 'clubs
cannot sign any contract with a third party which may have an impact
on loans or transfers or may create any obligation from clubs towards
a third party in case of temporary or permanent transfer of a
player."' 0 9
2. Leagues Permitting TPO
While the practice of TPO was already prohibited for leagues in
England and Poland, the remainder of leagues worldwide did not
prohibit TPO until FIFA's worldwide ban.11 0 The practice of TPO is
still widely implemented throughout South America, and to a lesser

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Villas-Boas Pires, supra note 13.
Ornstein, supra note 6.

108. KEA EUR. AFFAIRS & THE CTR. FOR THE LAw & EcoN. OF SPORTS, STUDY ON
THE ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRANSFERS OF PLAYERS 66 (2013),

http://ec.europa.eulassets/eac/sport/library/documents/cons-study-transfers-finalrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/8C48-A56G] (archived Dec. 2, 2018) [hereinafter KEA-CDES].
109. Id.
110. James Robinson, When Tevez and Mascherano Went to West Ham, THESE
FOOTBALL TIMES (May 30, 2015), https://thesefootballtimes.col2015/05/30/when-tevezand-mascherano-went-to-west-ham/ [https://perma.cclYQT4-Q727] (archived Nov. 4,
2018).
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extent in Portugal.1"' After completing an extensive market study
throughout all European countries containing large football leagues,
KPMG discovered that TPO was a very common practice within
Europe.1 12 Its findings were released almost two years prior to FIFA's
ban on the practice.113
In 2013, investors in both Spain and Portugal possessed thirdparty holdings in players that amounted to about C1. 1 billion in Europe
alone.11 4 Those holdings involved over 1,100 players total.11 5 These
figures amounted to 5.7 percent of the European transfer market at
the time.11 6 Immediately following the release of Article 18 under the
revised FIFA regulations, Spain and Portugal launched challenges to
the new ban on TPO.11 7 Leagues in these countries do not have the
financial might to compete with the likes of giant European leagues
such as the EPL. As of 2013, two years prior to FIFA's international
ban of TPO, 75 percent of the total market value of players in European
leagues was held by leagues that allowed TPO.11 8 Twenty-four percent
of the market value located in European leagues permitting TPO was
held within Spanish and Portuguese leagues-18 percent and 6
percent respectively." 9 The other 76 percent of that market value was
located in countries throughout Europe, with the majority of that value
located in Central Europe, and only 6 percent of that market value held
in Eastern Europe. 2 0
To serve as a general example, most clubs (besides the world's
superpower clubs like Manchester City, Barcelona, and Bayern
Miinchen) receive the majority of their profits from television revenuesharing rights they gain from being a member of the league in which
they play. For example, in 2015 the EPL signed a three-year, £5.14
billion television-rights deal with domestic television outlets; domestic
television revenue is apportioned to each club based on merit and a
lump-sum value ranging from £156 million to the top earner and £99

111. See Brian Homewood, FIFA to ban third-partyownership of players,
REUTERS (Sept. 26, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-soccer-fifa-players/fifa-toban-third-party-ownership-of-players-idUSKCNHL1DT20140926
[https://perma.cc/AE8Y-NZA5] (archived Nov. 4, 2018).
112. KPMG, supra note 10, at 6.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 7 (calculated by adding the percentages provided in a pie chart of
"total market value players where TPO practice is allowed").
115. The Business of Football:Third Party Ownership of Players, THE DEAL
ROOM (Oct. 2, 2014), https://www.firmex.com/thedealroom/third-partner-ownership-offootball-players/ [https://perma.cc/A94L-UAG9] (archived Nov. 4, 2018) [hereinafter
Business of Football].
116. Id.
117. Spain and Portugalchallenge Fifa's ban on third-party ownership, THE
GUARDIAN (Feb. 10, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/feb/10/portugalspain-fifa-ban-third-party-ownership [https://perma.cclZ7Y9-DPRF] (archived Nov. 4,
2018) [hereinafter Spain and Portugal].
118. See KPMG, supra note 10, at 7.
119. See id.
120. See id.
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million to the bottom earner. 121 Spain, on the other hand, entered into
a similar domestic television-rights deal in February of 2016, for the
same three-season period spanning 2016 to 2019, worth only £1.8
billion; in La Liga, television revenue is divided on a lump sum equal
basis to each club (where each club earns C50 million, or £44.2 million),
as well as a merit basis where the top earning club earns C100 million
annually and the bottom earning club earns a modest C12 million. 122
Clearly, there is a disparity between the capital-in the form of
transfer fees-entering and ultimately exiting the two most
competitive leagues in the world, the EPL and La Liga. While England
could comfortably ban TPO and stay ahead of the competitive curve by
subsidizing ever-increasing transfer fees with television revenue,
leagues such as La Liga favor only the top performing clubs, and topto-bottom have fallen behind on the competitive landscape. To offset
this disparity, Spain-and other leagues such as the Primeira Liga in
Portugal-challenged the ban on TPO.
a. Spain & Portugal
Immediately following the release of Article 18 under the revised
FIFA regulations, both the Spanish and Portuguese Football
Associations launched challenges to the new ban on TPO.1 23 The major
domestic leagues within each country, La Liga and Primeira Liga,
argued that the ban infringed on competition rules and the free
movement of labor and capital. 12 4 Primarily, the leagues argued that
the ban is specifically targeted to hurt clubs "with fewer economic
resources," which limits a club's ability to not only purchase players,
but develop them as well.1 25
KPMG found that TPO is a common practice in Portugal, where
about one in four players is subject to some ownership form utilizing
TPO mechanisms. 12 6 The market value of players under TPO in
Portugal was about £267 million, about 30 percent of the entire market
value of players within the country. 127 Clubs relied heavily on TPO, as

121. Owen Gibson, Sky and BT Retain PremierLeague TV Rights for Record
£5.14bn, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/feb/
10/premier-league-tv-rights-sky-bt [https://perma.cc/XB7C-YGVM] (archived Nov. 8,
2018).
122. Spanish La Liga New 3 Year TV Deal Worth C2.65 (2016-19), TOTAL
SPORTEK (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.totalsportek.com/money/spanish-la-liga-new-3year-tv-deal-worth-e2-65-billion/ [https://perma.cc/96V6-HNFZ] (archived Nov. 4, 2018).
123. Spain and Portugal, supra note 117.
124. See Spain, Portugal againstFIFA ban of third-party ownership, USA TODAY
(Feb. 10, 2015, 8:45 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/soccer/2015/02/10/
spain-portugal-against-fifa-ban-of-third-party-ownership23163063/
[https://perma.ccl23SZ-9Y9G] (archived Nov. 4, 2018).
125. Id.
126. See KPMG, supra note 10, at 8.
127. Id.
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a considerable percentage of players within the country were affected
by the practice two years prior to its prohibition.
In Spain, the reliance on TPO was not quite as widespread, but
still of a hefty enough size to warrant investigation. The estimated
market value of players under TPO agreements throughout Spain was
about C163 million in 2013, the equivalent of about 8 percent of the
market value of all players throughout Spain.1 28 While this figure
seems miniscule in the grand scheme of things, it is not without value.
KPMG stated that the football investment funds in Spain had "greatly
increased in recent years, and are being used by clubs with difficulties
in financing the acquisition of new players."12 9 It could be hypothesized
that if TPO agreements were not banned, the percentage of players in
Spain under such agreements would likely have increased to an even
more substantial figure.
b. Eastern Europe & South America
South America led the way in the evolution of TPO structures and,
along with large blocks of Eastern Europe, has relied on TPO to fund
its football clubs since the origination of the practice.1 3 0 The practice of
TPO throughout Eastern Europe was more prevalent than throughout
any other part of Europe.13 1 Clubs in Eastern Europe possessed an
estimated TPO-market share in the range of 40 percent to 50 percent
prior to FIFA's Article 18 ban. 3 2 The market value of players under
TPO contractual agreements was about C406.5 million, or about C140
million more than the next closest region (Portugal).' 3 3
South America has stood staunchly against any worldwide ban on
TPO since FIFA and select European leagues began to ban the practice
in recent years. 134 While accurate financial figures are hard to fmd in
regards to South American TPO agreements, the controversial practice
has thrived in the region due to the lower socioeconomic backgrounds
that many players grow up within. 3 5 Studies have estimated that
around 90 percent of players in Brazil's top league, Campeonato
Brasileiro S6rie A, are owned through some form of TPO agreement.1 36

128. Id.
129. Id. at 6.
130. Business of Football, supra note 115.
131. KPMG, supra note 10.
132. Id.
133. See id.
134. See Business of Football, supra note 115.
135. Id.
136. Poonam Majithia, Third Party Ownership-a Brazilianperspective, LAW IN
SPORT (Mar. 21, 2014), https://www.lawinsport.com/topics/articles/employmentlaw/item/third-party-ownership-a-brazilian-perspective [https://perma.cc/8LC5-AH4E]
(archived Nov. 4, 2018).
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2. FIFA-Article 18, Article 18bis, Article 18ter
On December 22, 2014, J~r6me Valcke, the Secretary General of
FIFA at the time, released Circular No. 1464, alerting international
footballing bodies that FIFA recently promulgated new regulations on
the status and transfers of players-specifically targeting TPO of
players' economic rights.1 3 7 The circular noted that the FIFA Executive
Committee, at a meeting that took place from September 25 to 26,
2014, passed a decision on a revised regulatory approach to a ban on
TPO of players' economic rights.13 8 The regulations containing this ban
were approved by the FIFA Executive Committee at a set of meetings
that took place on December 18 and 19, 2014 and came into force on
May 1, 2015.139 The findings and conclusions of the FIFA Executive
Committee on TPO are codified within Article 18 of the FIFA
Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players and are laid out as
follows:1 40

a.

Article 18: Special Provisions Relating to Contracts between
Professionals and Clubs

The introductory section of Article 18 states that any intermediary
involved in the negotiation of a contract "shall" be named in that
contract.141 The section also specifies requirements pertaining to the
age of players and length of contracts, as well as other boilerplate
terms, such as that a successful medical examination and work permit
must be completed and procured prior to ratification of the contract. 14 2
FIFA's regulations are more so guidelines for other leagues to
adopt than regulatory regimes of their own.1 43 For example, FIFA
regulations limit the length of a contract to five years, but the EPL sets
no maximum length of contracts, stating contracts may be for "any
length of time."1 44 Largely, administrative and regulatory decisions
have been left to individual leagues and competitions, even though

137. Memorandum from FIFA to its Members, Circular No. 1464: Regulations on
the Status and Transfer of Players (Dec. 22, 2014), http://resources.fifa.com/mm/
document/affederation/administration/02/49/57/42/tpocircularl464enneutral.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J5GE-HT39] (archived Nov. 4, 2018) [hereinafter FIFA Circular].
138. Id. at 1.
139. Id.
140. FIFA REGULATIONS, supra note 83, at 19-21.
141. Id. at 19.
142. Id.
143. See id. at 14, 21, 61. FIFA's goal was to ban the practice worldwide, not just
within its own competitive sphere. Upon passing their regulations, FIFA urged all
leagues around the world to either follow suit or continuously permit FIFA to fine
teams within their league that continued to employ third-party ownership structures.
See id.
144. Id.
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FIFA has offered guidance on the topic. 145 That being said, some
regulations are required to be accepted for FIFA recognition as a
proper footballing body, such as 18bis and 18ter, discussed below.
Additionally, some competitions require compliance with FIFA
regulations or are organized by FIFA itself, thus requiring compliance
as well.
b. Article 18bis: Third-Party Influence on Clubs
Under section 18bis, FIFA forbids clubs from entering into
contracts that allow any third party to acquire the ability to influence
employment

or transfer-related

"matters,

. .

. policies

or

the

performance of its teams." 146 Within 18bis, FIFA leaves a stark
warning that the FIFA Disciplinary Committee "may impose
disciplinary measures on clubs that do not observe the obligations" of
18bis.1 4 7
The actual TPO ban that FIFA uses to punish clubs around the
world is found within 18bis, but only relates to the third-party's ability
to influence club policy. 1 4 8 The regulation itself does not speak to

actual, silent ownership of a player, which would seem to leave the door
open to some form of alternative ownership by a third party, as long as
said owner exerts no influence over the club or its operations. FIFA
rectified this odd loophole with the enactment of 18ter, seemingly
permitting TPO as long as the owner is a silent party. 14 9
c. Article 18ter: Third-Party Ownership of Players' Economic Rights
Section 18ter, which went into effect on May 1, 2015, categorically
forbids the practice of TPO in international football:
No club or player shall enter into an agreement with a third party whereby a
third party is being entitled to participate, either in full or in part, in
compensation payable in relation to the future transfer of a player from one club
to another, or is being assigned any rights in relation to a future transfer or
transfer compensation.

150

Section 18ter also provides that contracts predating May 1, 2015 could
continue in place as they were agreed upon, but could not be extended

145. See id. at 3. Many major regulatory changes will trickle down from the top,
with FIFA initially promulgating a specific regulation to see how leagues around the
world react, and allowing leagues to then adopt what they deem will fit their locales
the best. Id.
146. Id. at 20.
147. Id.
148. See id. 18bis is titled "third-party influence on clubs," and seeks to assure
that no football club enters into a contract that "enables any other party ... to acquire
the ability to influence . . . its policies or the performance of its terms." Id.
149. See supraPart II.C.3.c.
150. FIFA REGULATIONS, supra note 83, at 21.
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in reliance upon the original terms; this provision has the effect of
forcing teams to buy out the third-party owner, sell the player to
eliminate the third-party owner's interest, or renegotiate the TPO
agreement completely.151 FIFA also stated that no TPO agreements
could be entered into during the four-month period between the
announcement of 18ter in January 2015 and its official enactment in
May. 15 2 FIFA, through 18ter, also required TPO agreements that were
slated to continue to be recorded within the Transfer Matching System
(TMS), so that all information regarding the third party involved in the
transaction, as well as the full name of the player and duration of the
agreement, were known to the governing body.' 5 3 Lastly, FIFA
designated the FIFA Disciplinary Committee as the entity to "impose
disciplinary measures on clubs or players" that refused or failed to
follow Article 18ter to its exact specifications.1 54 Both 18bis and 18ter
are binding at the national level and are required by FIFA to be
incorporated into each football associations' regulations in some form
or fashion.15 5

III. ANALYSIS

A. Applicability of FIFA Regulations in Relation to Domestic League
Rules
Before delving deeper into TPO regulatory issues, attention must
be turned towards the applicability of FIFA regulations. Is FIFA the
ultimate authority in football? Can FIFA punish teams in direct
conflict with its rules and regulations? National footballing
organizations, such as the English FA and the United States Soccer
Federation, must comply with FIFA regulations in order to compete in
tournaments sponsored by the international regulatory body. The
three main articles regulating TPO-18, 18bis, and 18ter-are listed
within the Introductory Provision of FIFA's Regulations on the Status
and Transfer of Players handbook; these three provisions, along with
a limited amount of others, are binding at the "national level and must
be included without modification in the association's regulations.156
To be clear, the regulations mentioned above have no bearing on the
FIFA World Cup, as such competition only permits national teams as
competitors. Changes to TPO regulations would have no bearing or
impact on the World Cup, as TPO regulations only apply to individual,

151. Id. at 21.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. FIFA Circular, supra note 137, at 3.
156. See FIFA REGULATIONS, supra note 83, at 80-81 (discussing the scope of the
regulatory handbook and which rules must be adopted by national footballing
associations for recognition by FIFA).
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independent football clubs and not national domestic/country football
squads.
The question remains, though, as to how certain domestic leagues,
such as Spain's La Liga and Portugal's Primeira Liga, continue the
operation of TPO structures, even though FIFA fines clubs after
finding them guilty of continuing to employ TPO. The answer may be
that FIFA's regulations are not binding on all football leagues. FIFA's
regulations define "organised football" as "association football
organised under the auspices of FIFA, the confederations and the
associations, or authorised by them."1 57 It is clear from Section 1,
subsection 1 that the regulations provided within the FIFA handbook
clubs belonging to
are "global and binding rules concerning ...
different associations." 5 8 While "association" is not included within
the definitions section of the handbook, it can be assumed from the
definition of "organised football" that the only leagues responsible for
following the regulations contained within the handbook are those
organized under the "auspices of FIFA."'59 Thus, domestic leagues,
such as the two aforementioned leagues, should be free to pursue their
own rules and regulations permitting TPO as they feel necessary.
To rebuke such practices, FIFA could ban leagues that permit
TPO from FIFA-sanctioned competitions for clubs, such as the FIFA
Club World Cup (a competition that invites champions from regional
competitions around the world) if their league of association
membership permits TPO.160 But FIFA has taken no steps toward
that: the current champion, Real Madrid, hails from a domestic
league-La Liga-that stands in staunch opposition to FIFA's TPO
ban.161
B. CIES Report
The CIES report, commissioned by FIFA, reported the findings of
the CIES study of TPO in world football.1 62 FIFA utilized this report
in large part when deciding to completely ban TPO, but the conclusions
provided by the CIES seem to contradict FIFA's ultimate response.163
While the report found that TPO concerns varied across
association types, sizes, and location, the conclusions of the report

157. Id. at 81.
158. Id. at 7.
159. See id. at 79.
160. Dave Fraser, What is the Fifa Club World Cup, which teams take part, when
is it held and what TV channel is it on?, THE SUN (Dec. 13, 2016, 6:45 PM),
https://www.thesun.co.uk/sport/football/22 14527/fifa-club-world-cup-real-madridatletico-nacional-club-america/ [https://perma.cc/7QK9-HKBF] (archived Nov. 8, 2018).
161. See FIFA Club World Cup UAE 2018, FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/clubworld
cup/index.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2018) [https://perma.ccl3BLF-RKUTR] (archived
Nov. 4, 2018).
162. CIES REPORT, supra note 19, at 2.
163. See id. at 4.
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contradict FIFA's reasoning for banning TPO completely. 16 4 For
example, conclusion (f) states as follows:
Reliable information on the scale of the phenomenon [third party ownership] is
rare and it is therefore impossible for the time being to estimate its global
significance (an additional study based for example on a survey of the players
could shed more light in this regard). Nevertheless, it is clear that the practice
exists-in one form or another-and is concentrated in certain regions, logically
165
those where the economic stakes are the highest.

If reliable information was not available as to the scale or size of
the phenomenon, but only a statement that the practice of TPO exists
in some form, it seems that a complete ban on the practice is aggressive
until a full investigation has been undertaken and completed as to its
prevalence worldwide. Had FIFA relied upon the report completed by
KPMG, it would have arrived at a more acceptable regulatory solution.
With a qualifier as damning to legitimacy as that provided within the
CIES report, it's hard to understand why a complete ban was
immediately warranted based off the utilized data.1 66
These conclusions do not match the response reached by FIFA.
While the report explicitly mentioned the proposals of certain
influential footballing bodies, such as the French and English
federations, to prohibit TPO throughout the FIFA territory, it merely
listed other federations, such as the Portuguese, Brazilian, and
Austrian federations, as those permitting TPO at the time of the
study-the report made no mention of their opposition to a potential
banishment or that their national laws run counter to a ban of the
nature FIFA created. 167 Further research should have been completed
by FIFA prior to implementing a worldwide ban (which has not turned
out to be incredibly effective) of TPO.
C. European Law and TPO
FIFA's blanket ban on TPO runs counter to independent countries'
domestic legal codes, to EU articles and agreements, and to precedents
set by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). FIFA seems
to genuinely disregard the legal codes of the many countries and unions
its regulations impact.1 68 European law has approached TPO through
a variety of means-through country-specific prohibitions on limiting

164. See id.
165. Id.
166. See id.; KPMG, supra note 10, at 10.
167. See CIES REPORT, supra note 19, at 8-4.
168. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union arts. 63, 65, 154, Sept. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]; Case C519/04, David Meca-Medina & Igor Majeen v. Comm'n of the European Cmty., 2006
E.C.R. 1-06991 [hereinafter Meca Medina]; Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des
Socidt6s de Football Ass'n ASBL v. Jean-Marc Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-04921
[hereinafter Bosman]; CIES REPORT, supra note 19, at 3-4.
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the free movement of people and capital,' 6 9 agreements between the
EU and international footballing bodies, 1 70 and EU cases and
articles.'"7 From a worldwide ban by FIFA, to certain domestic league
regulations, and ultimately political policies concerning the free
movement of capital, a picture of what is permitted as to TPO is far
from clear. To understand the trends leading up to and following
FIFA's blanket ban, an analysis of competing laws and regulations is
necessary. The following analysis will flow similarly to how the order
of authorities would flow: beginning with EU law, CJEU opinions, and
domestic or national law, and concluding with miscellaneous
applicable EU articles.
1. European Union Law
a. 2001 Agreement: European Commission and FIFA/UEFA
The 2001 Agreement was announced following a meeting between
commissioners of the European Commission and the presidents of
FIFA and the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA), Sepp
Blatter and Lennart Johansson, respectively.1 7 2 The agreement served
as a pact between the EU and the two major governing international
football bodies.' 7 3 The European Commission hoped that this
resolution would provide for "an appropriate balance between a
player's fundamental right to free movement and the stability of
contracts between clubs and players."1 74 It attempted to achieve this
balance through the creation of a "solidarity mechanism" and the
stricter enforcement of Article 63, pertaining to the free movement of
75
capital throughout the EU.'

b. Solidarity Mechanism
A primary product of the 2001 Agreement, the solidarity
mechanism, demands that "each time a professional is transferred
before the end of his contract, a solidarity contribution [a division of
the transfer fee received for the player] is due by the new club to all
the clubs for which the player played between the age of 12 and 23."176
The goal of the solidarity contribution is to "redistribute a significant

169. CIES REPORT, supra note 19, at 3.
170. European Commission Press Release IP/01/314, Outcome of Discussions
between the Commission and FIFAJUEFA on FIFA Regulations on International
Football Transfers (Mar. 5, 2001) [hereinafter EC Press Release IP/01/314].
171. See TFEU, supranote 168, arts. 63, 65, 154; Meca-Medina, 2006 E.C.R. at I7019-20; Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-5059.
172. EC Press Release IP/01/314, supra note 170.
173. KEA-CDES, supranote 108, at 3.
174. Id. at 89.
175. TFEU, supra note 168, art. 63; FRANS DE WEGER, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
THE FIFA DISPUTE RESOLUTION CHAMBER 447 (2d ed. 2016).

176.

DE WEGER, supranote 175, at 447.

204

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 52:179

proportion of income to clubs involved in the training and education of
a player." 1 77 The 2001 Agreement also provided that the percentage of
the fee siphoned from the total transfer fee to be distributed among
previous clubs of the player would range from 5 percent to 10 percent,
a variable amount depending on the player's age at the time of
transfer.1 7 8
It's apparent from this agreement that FIFA has sanctioned the
division of transfer fees between separate parties in the past, as well
as demonstrating an example of previous EU intervention or
interjection into shaping certain FIFA or UEFA regulatory policies. 7 9
While proponents of a TPO ban may point to the fact that ownership
interests differ when comparing the movement of players under
normal, dual-party ownership and players under TPO arrangements,
this argument can be refuted. If FIFA were to even attempt to
distinguish between forms of third-party ownership, the practice may
be able to continue.
FIFA could very easily distinguish between the two types of TPO.
As discussed above, there are two primary types of TPO: investment
TPOs and financing TPOs. Financing-TPO arrangements are used
predominantly to serve the balance sheet, or financial, needs of a club,
while investment-TPO arrangements are used to finance the
acquisition of a player.1 80 Arguably, such arrangements are
established when a club is extending beyond its financial means.1 81
FIFA could differentiate between the two and achieve a very similar
result, as it did in the 2001 Agreement's solidarity contribution
agreement. The solidarity contribution was meant to fulfill a primary
goal of the 2001 Agreement: to help with the spread of money
throughout football markets, as well as ease financial concerns for
lower-league clubs that trained young players only to see them go on
and sell for millions of euros at other clubs.1 82 If FIFA were to adopt a
discriminatory regime, permitting the financing TPO while continuing
to forbid the investment TPO, the same goals of the 2001 Arrangement
could be produced. By permitting teams to sell a percentage of a
player's rights due to necessity, the overall financial health of clubs
within the game would improve. Teams could sell off a percentage of a
current player they own, and in return use the money to improve the
day-to-day operations of the club: improve facilities, pay for player

177. EC Press Release IP/01/314, supra note 170.
178. See What is a Solidarity Contribution in Football?, FIELDOo BLOG (Apr. 17,
2014), http://blog.fieldoo.com/2014/04/what-is-solidarity-contribution-in-football
[http://perma.cc/H9AG-FLAY] (archived Nov. 8, 2018).
179. See EC Press Release IP/01/314, supranote 170.
180. KPMG, supra note 10, at 13.
181. See id.
182. See EC Press Release IP/01/314, supra note 170. The 2001 Agreement
eliminated the age requirement of player transfers, allowing lesser clubs to sell a youth
player at a young age for a large sum of money, created a sanction system that limited
unilateral contract breach to an offseason time frame, and created a training
compensation to encourage and reward the training efforts of clubs, "in particular
small clubs." Id.
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training, or pay player wages, for example. By discriminating between
the multiple types of TPO and choosing to forbid the investment-TPO
scheme, the true harms of TPO that FIFA wanted to avoidcorruption-would still be avoided. Clubs would simply be permitted
to employ a diluted version of TPO. While a third-party interest must
still be dealt with when the player transfers in the future, terms and
limits could be placed within the initial financing-TPO contract. Terms
such as autonomous negotiations between the owning team and
purchasing team, repayment clauses, and indemnity clauses could
create a regime where TPO is permitted and the harms FIFA is terribly
afraid of could be completely avoided.
c. Free Movement of Players
The free movement of capital, embodied within Article 63 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), provides
that "all restrictions on the movement of capital between Member
States and between Member States and third countries shall be
prohibited."1 8 3 FIFA's worldwide ban of the practice of TPO is arguably
in direct violation of Article 63.184 In December of 2014, FIFA
announced that the following May that it would institute a global ban
of TPO. On February 2, 2015, not two months after the global ban was
announced, Spain's La Liga and Portugal's Primeira Liga brought legal
proceedings against FIFA. 85 The leagues argued that the blanket ban
on TPO worldwide violated EU "competition law and the fundamental
86
rights to free movement of capital and workers."1
In fact, Johan Lindholm painted the picture of EU authority
within the realm of football perfectly in his 2016 article arguing that

FIFA's ban of TPO may be illegal:
It is well established that measures governing sport activities fall under the
scope of the treaties of the European Union in so far as they constitute 'economic
activity' . . . the Court of Justice of the European Union has . ..

held that

professional... sport in general and football in particular constitutes 'an economic
activity' to which the Treaties apply ... the Commission has specifically and
explicitly pointed out that 'the transfer of athletes in return for transfer fees'
187
constitutes an economic activity.

There is a strong argument that FIFA's series of articles used to
ban TPO worldwide are illegal, and within the scope of the EU's
jurisdiction, wherein legal action can be brought to attempt to reverse
the banishment of the practice.' 8 8 Lindholm proposed a substantial

183. TFEU, supra note 168, art. 63.
184. See id.
185. See Johan Lindholm, Can I Please Have a Slice of Ronaldo? The Legality of
FIFA's Ban on Third-Party Ownership Under European Union Law, 15 INT'L SPORTS
L.J. 137, 138 (2016).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 139.
188. See id. at 138-39.
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test to determine whether FIFA's TPO ban is in fact an impediment on
the free movement of capital, as defined in Article 63.189
Lindholm's test suggested that three questions must be answered
in order to determine such: (1) does the ban have a direct effect (can a
private entity, or third-party investor, rely on Article 63 in opposition
to FIFA); (2) to what extent does the free movement of capital apply to
TPO, and finally; (3) does the ban constitute an obstacle to the free
movement of capital? 9 0
The remainder of this subpart will address the three questions
proposed by Lindholm, but will alter his test slightly. The following
will propose that questions (1) and (3) are repetitive, and that the third
question should instead address whether or not there are alternative
forms of a TPO ban that could comply with Article 63. This short
analysis will ultimately answer each part of this tripartite test
affirmatively: (1) yes, the total ban of TPO has a direct effect on the
free movement of capital; (2) yes, Article 63 does cover the economic
rights every football player possesses; and (3) yes, there are sufficient
alternative forms of TPO that could protect FIFA's interests while
aligning those interests with EU law. 191
The free movement of capital throughout the EU and non-EU
countries is an "essential element for the proper functioning of the
large European internal market," thus any regulation inhibiting that
movement must be scrutinized with extra care. 192 To comply with the
expectations of the free movement of capital, a market participant
must be able to offer its resources and financial strength throughout
the entire EU, especially in those locations where interest is
93
greatest.s
The EU and CJEU provide no explicit definition for "movement of
capital," but instead illustrate the meaning of the phrase through
various judicial decisions and directives. 194 Directive 88/361/EEC
provides various lists of terms, activities, and articles that help to
determine whether something inhibits the free movement of capital. 9 s
A few examples of cross-border capital movement activities or actions
that must be protected as the free movement of capital are foreign
direct investments, real estate investments and purchases, securities

189. Id. at 140-41.
190. Id.
191. See id.
192. Free movement of capitalin the EU, EUROPEDIA, http://www.europedia.
moussis.eulbooks/Book_2/3/6/07/?all=1 (last visited Dec. 2, 2018) [https://perma.cc/
335K-K59A] (archived Nov. 8, 2018).
193. Id.
194. Capital movements, EUR. COMM'N, https://ec.europa.eulinfolbusinesseconomy-euro/banking-and-finance/financial-markets/capital-movements-en (last
visited Nov. 9, 2018) [https://perma.cc/G5KN-LRZZ] (archived Nov. 8, 2018).
195. Council Directive 88/361/EEC of the Council of the European Communities
1988 O.J. (L 178) L178/5, at 8 [hereinafter Council Directive 88/361/EEC].
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investments, granting of loans and credit, and other operations with
financial institutions. 19 6
Lindholm argues correctly that FIFA's ban does in fact have a
direct effect on the free movement of capital, and also points out that
this would be a prime opportunity for the CJEU to determine to what
extent Article 63 could be applied to a private entity such as FIFA.1 9 7
Lindholm cites Walrave v. Association Union Cycliste Internationalein
support of this belief, stating that within Walrave the CJEU "declared
that sports' governing bodies must respect the right to free movement
of persons and services by merit of these governing bodies de facto
having and exercising the regulatory function in a particular
market."1 9 8 Lindholm concludes by transposing arguments from other
CJEU cases concerning the freedom of the movement of capital:
FIFA, UEFA, and the national governing bodies almost exclusively regulate the
conditions for access to the football player market. Thus, the right to free
movement of capital on this market would become illusory if these actors were
exempted from its scope on the grounds that they are not public authorities, the
very thing that the Court has not been willing to accept when it comes to the
other fundamental freedoms. It therefore appears very likely that in a case like
the one at hand, the free movement of capital can be invoked against a private
entity like FIFA.1 9 9

By combining the EU's fluid definition of "movement of capital"
and Lindholm's persuasive argument as to why FIFA cannot inhibit
the free movement of capital, it must be concluded that prong one is
answered in the affirmative. The CJEU's opinion that sports'
governing bodies, such as FIFA, act as regulating bodies for that sector
of the market would lead any reasonable person to conclude that such
sports' governing bodies can inhibit the free movement of capital by
improperly regulating their sector of the market. 200
It also must be concluded that the free movement of capital applies
to TPO. As Lindholm begins to point out, a player's economic rights are
a form of direct investment, bringing such activity within the purview
of Article 63.201 Direct investment generally refers to the movement of
securities or other financial instruments throughout the EU. 202 As
referenced previously, the transfer of a football player is similar to the
purchase or sale of a stock on the stock market.20 3 The similarities

196. Capital movements, supra note 194.
197. Lindholm, supranote 185, at 140.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 141.
200. See id. at 140.
201. See id. at 141 ("Investment in football player transfer fees is obviously not a
traditional type of investment ... but the CJEU has interpreted Article 63 TFEU's
scope, which is not defined in the Treaties, broadly. Third party ownership likely
qualifies as a so-called direct investment.")
202. See Council Directive 88/361/EEC, supra note 195, at 8.
203. See supra Part II.A.1. (describing what the transfer of a football player is
and what attributes it necessarily involves).
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between direct investment in stocks is directly comparable to the
purchase of football players through the transfer market, they are both
one in the same.
Again, a player has two sets of rights: economic and federative. 204
Federative rights are binary, so there are only two options; a player
either has them (and can be registered with the league in which their
club participates) or does not have them (thus the player cannot be
registered with the league in which their club participates).
Alternatively, economic rights possess many of the same
characteristics that a security or stock traded on the stock market
possesses. 205 Some of those characteristics include: risk/return (a
security can gain value or lose value, just as a player can suffer a career
ending injury at any point in time); volatility (stock markets are
volatile, and can fluctuate in value daily, just as a player can gain
transfer value through good performances and lose value through poor
form/performances); selection (stock markets offer a wide range of
instruments, just as the entire world of football offers players at
different positions, with different characteristics or different levels of
talent); liquidity (market makers stand ready to sell a security at any
time while the market is open, just as teams can transfer players at
any time when the transfer market is open); global nature (every major
economy possesses a stock market, just as professional football leagues
are prevalent throughout the world's major countries); and lastly,
regulation (stock markets are regulated by a financial regulatory body,
just as football is regulated by FIFA or a specific country's football
association).206

It is clear, following comparison, that a player's economic rights
are the equivalent of a security being traded on a stock market. So, to
answer Lindholm's question, the free movement of capital does in fact
apply to TPO. The transfer of economic rights is the equivalent of a
direct investment, or capital moving throughout the economy, which
the EU has already stated falls directly within the safeguards of Article
63.207

Lindholm ends his three-prong analysis with the following
question: Does the ban constitute an obstacle to the free movement of
capital? 20 8 This prong appears to be repetitive, relating closely to prong
one ("does the ban have a direct effect on the movement of capital?"). A

204. See supra Part II.B.1. (describing the difference between the economic and
federative rights every player possesses).
205. See Common Stock Features, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/walkthrough/corporate-finance/3/stockvaluation/common-stock.aspx (last visited Nov. 9, 2018) [https://perma.cc/2H23-WCAG]
(archived Nov. 8, 2018).
206. Chirantan Basu, 6 Characteristicsof Stock Markets, ZACKS (updated May
22, 2018), https://finance.zacks.com/6-characteristics-stock-markets-2511.html
[https://perma.ccl7D2C-N4RY] (archived Nov. 8, 2018).
207. Council Directive 88/361/EEC, supranote 195, at 8.
208. Lindholm, supra note 185, at 141.
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better question would ask whether there is an alternative option. Are
there alternative forms of TPO that would permit the free movement
of capital, but also allow FIFA to regulate TPO?
A strong case can be made that there is an alternative scheme for
FIFA to employ that would permit TPO in a limited form, but not
restrict the free movement of capital. It has already been established
that the EU defers to sports' governing bodies, such as FIFA, as the
regulatory bodies in charge of their individual market segments. 2 09
Thus, FIFA should be permitted to restrict the practice of TPO, but not
with unbridled authority. Such action would most likely be permitted
by the EU and CJEU through deference to a regulatory body's
expertise within its market segment.
As has been discussed, there are two distinct types of TPO. 21 0
FIFA could delineate between the two, and permit financing TPOs
while banning investment TPOs. Investment TPOs are used to
purchase a player that a club cannot afford, while financing TPOs are
used when a club sells a portion of the rights of a currently owned
player in efforts to fund the continued existence of the club. 2 11 In other
words, financing TPOs are employed by clubs that cannot afford to
continue operations or meet current obligations, an objective FIFA
recognized as an issue it wanted to improve within the 2001
Agreement. The results of this three-question inquiry should surely
lead the EU to the result that, not only does FIFA's TPO ban infringe
upon Article 63, but that there are suitable alternatives that could
arguably evade such infringement.
2. Court of Justice of the European Union
Several decisions from the CJEU paint a vivid picture of the reach
the judicial system may have over continental (UEFA) and
international (FIFA) football regulatory bodies; two decisions in
particular, discussed below, seem to broaden the reach of the EU legal
system over regulatory actions UEFA and FIFA may take. 212 In Union
Royale Belge des Socidtis de FootballAssociationASBL v. Bosman, the
CJEU found that UEFA regulations could run counter to certain EU
articles, and that the EU could curtail those regulations in efforts to
force compliance with EU law, specifically the free movement of
labor. 213 More importantly, Meca-Medina v. Commission of the
European Communities established the supremacy of EU law over the
regulations of sports federations, further supporting the premise that

209. See infra Part III.C.
210. See infra Part II.B.2.
211. See id.
212. See Case C-519/04, David Meca-Medina & Igor Majeen v. Comm'n of the
European Cmty., 2006 E.C.R. 1-06991, at 7021-27; Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge
des Soci6t6s de Football Ass'n ASBL v. Jean-Marc Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-04921, at
5079-80.
213. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 5055.
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the EU could take direct action to force FIFA to change its regulations
relating to TPO. 2 14

a. Bosman
Bosman stands as one of the most important rulings concerning
football and the free movement of labor throughout Europe since the
creation of the EU.2 15 The 1995 decision was one of the first cases
decided by the CJEU that limited the power of sports' regulatory bodies
with a continental or international reach.21 6 The CJEU ultimately
banned restrictions on foreign EU players within national leagues, and
permitted players within the EU to move between clubs after the
expiration of their contracts without requiring the acquiring team to
pay a transfer fee for such player. 2 17 Prior to Bosman, a player was not
permitted to leave their club at the end of their contract unless one of
two things occurred: either the club renounced the player's rights, both
economic and federative (thus, agreed to let the player leave the team
for free); or, the club could sell the player's rights to an acquiring club
(the equivalent of a transfer fee). 2 18 Bosman was at the end of his
contract with a club in Belgium (RFC Liege) and wanted to move to a
club in France (USL Dunkerque) that had offered him an improved
contract. 2 19 RFC Liege refused to let him move to USL Dunkerque
unless the French club paid a transfer fee for Bosman. 220 Ultimately,
USL Dunkerque (a second-tier club, with little financial resources to
pay such a large transfer fee) conceded and gave up pursuing an
acquisition of Bosman. As a result, Bosman was stuck on RFC Liege's
roster, no longer a first-choice player, and RFC Liege cut his wages by
about 75 percent. 2 21
Bosman, aggrieved, brought legal action within the CJEU, citing
Article 48 of the Treaty of Rome (1957), which guaranteed the freedom
of movement for players throughout the EU. 2 22 The Treaty of Rome's
guarantee of freedom of movement is eerily similar to Article 63's

214. Meca-Medina, 2006 E.C.R. 7021-27.
215. See Gerard Brand, How the Bosman rule changed football-20 years on, SKY
SPORTS (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.skysports.com/football/news/11095/10100134/howthe-bosman-rule-changed-football-20-years-on [https://perma.cc/EQ73-33F5] (archived
Nov. 8, 2018).
216. See id. The Bosman decision limited FIFA and UEFA's regulatory powers by
completely changing how a player could move from team-to-team at the end of the
contract, changing how and if players were counted as foreigners towards competition
count requirements as to domestic or foreign roster composition, and permitting clubs
to play as many EU players as they wanted, strengthening the flow of capital and labor
throughout the continent. See id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
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guarantee of the freedom of movement of capital, which should aid in
a determination of Johan Lindholm's altered tripartite assessment, as
discussed in the previous subpart. 2 23
Ultimately, Bosman was victorious, providing a major windfall for
European players continent-wide. 2 24 The decision by the CJEU
permitted a player to leave a club on a free transfer after his contract
expired. 225 For once, power was given to the players, who could now
demand a transfer prior to the end of their contract, lest their current
club be left with nothing at the expiration of the player's current
contract. 226 The CJEU stated in its ruling that the provisions of Article
48 "are intended to facilitate the pursuit by Community citizens of
occupational activities of all kinds .

.

. and preclude measures which

might place Community citizens at a disadvantage when they wish to
pursue an economic activity in the territory of another Member
State."227 Further, the court stated that any provisions precluding or
deterring a national of a member state from leaving his country of
origin in order to exercise his right to freedom of movement constitutes
an obstacle to such freedom, even if such provisions apply regardless
of that individuals nationality.2 2 8 Ultimately, the court ruled that
requiring a new club to pay a transfer fee for a player whose contract
has already expired constituted an obstacle to the freedom of
229
movement for workers, thus said rule was deemed invalid.
The court justified its extension of judgment into national
footballing bodies from separate countries rather simply. The court
stated that:
[A]lthough the rules in issue in the main proceedings apply also to transfers
between clubs belonging to different national associations within the same
Member State and are similar to those governing transfers between clubs
belonging to the sane national association, they still directly affect players'
access to the employment market in other Member States and are thus capable
of impeding freedom of movement for workers . . . application of those rules
(Article 48) would still have to be ... to ensure achievement of the aim in
question.

223.
224.
225.
226.
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TFEU, supra note 168, art. 63; see infra Part III.C.1.c.
See infra Part III.C.1.c.
See id.
See id. (discussing how the Bosman ruling shifted power-share in

international football between player and club).

227. Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Soci~t6s de Football Ass'n ASBL v.
Jean-Marc Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-04921, ¶ 94 (emphasis added).
228. Id. T 96.
229. See id. ¶¶ 99-100 (implying that if a player is not under contract, they
should be free to leave the country and pursue other employment opportunities of their
own accord).
230. Id. T 103.
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Lastly, the CJEU propped a portion of its decision upon the
"considerable social importance of sporting activities," recognizing
football as one of the more important sporting activities in the EU.23
Not only does this case begin to support the notion that the
freedom of movement of labor-or by extension capital--can be
infringed upon by sports' regulatory bodies such as FIFA with overly
preclusive regulatory rules, this ruling also begins to paint the picture
that the CJEU and EU can issue rulings and opinions restricting
regulatory rules issued by sporting bodies, with UEFA serving as the
main culprit in the Bosman decision. 2 32

b. Meca-Medina
As previously mentioned, Meca-Medina helped to assure the
supremacy of EU law over the regulations of sporting bodies
throughout Europe. 233 Aside from that major step, the ruling helped
set the rules and scope of authorities' assessment of the validity of
transfer rules in relation to EU law principles on free movement and
competition. 2 34
The two plaintiffs in the proceedings, Meca-Medina and Majeen,
were long-distance swimmers from EU member states Spain and
Slovenia, respectively. 235 They both challenged the same antidoping
rules promulgated by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and
the F6d6ration Internationale de Natation (FINA), the swimming
equivalent of FIFA.2 36 Following a first- and second-place finish by the
two swimmers, both failed post-race doping tests, testing positive for
nandrolone, an anabolic steroid banned by FINA.23 7 Soon after being
hit with an initial four-year suspension, scientists discovered that
nandrolone can be produced naturally by the human body at levels that
surpass the permitted limit under FINA regulations-then set at two
nanograms per milliliter-if certain foods are consumed, such as boar
meat. 238 This finding led the swimmers to initiate legal action against

FINA and the IOC.
Following a series of hearings in front of the Court of Arbitration
for Sport, and an appeal in front of the same body, the swimmers were
left with a two-year ban. 239 Both swimmers then brought action within
the CJEU, claiming that IOC and FINA rules as to doping were

231. Id. 1 106.
232. See id.
233. See generally Case C-519/04, David Meca-Medina & Igor Majcen v. Comm'n
of the European Cmty., 2006 E.C.R. 1-06991.
234. See id. (establishing the supremacy of EU law and creating a rigid structure
for sports' regulatory bodies regulations to fall within).
235. Id. at 1-7006, 1-7009, 1 3'7.
236. Id. IT 2'1-6, 3'162'3.
237. Id. ¶ 3'8.
238. Id. ¶¶ 2'3-4, 3'9.
239. Id. 1 3'13.
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incompatible with EU rules concerning competition and freedom to
provide services. 24 0 Ultimately, the plaintiffs filed a complaint stating
that the antidoping rules breached Articles 81 and 82 of the European
Commission Treaty on Competition. 241 The plaintiffs were not only
challenging the compatibility of regulations adopted by the IOC and
implemented by FINA, but also certain doping-control practices within
the Community rules on competition and freedom to provide
services. 242 The swimmers claimed that the application of the
IOC/FINA rules and regulations led to the "infringement of the
athletes' economic freedoms, supposedly guaranteed by Article 49 of
the EC Treaty on Competition and infringed on their rights as
athletes-which may be asserted under Articles 81 and 82."243
The court ultimately held that "where a sporting activity takes the
form of gainful employment . .. which is true for the activity of semiprofessional or professional sportsm[e]n," it falls within the scope of
EU law; thus, EU law applied to the swimmers' complaint and
IOC/FINA regulations ran counter to established EU law. 244 While
discussing Article 39, the court stated that the "provisions on freedom
of movement for persons and freedom to provide services .

.

. extend

also to rules ... aimed at regulating gainful employment and the
provision of services in a collective manner." 24 5 The court then stated
that it would not regulate questions that were of purely sporting
interest and had nothing to do with economic activity, 246 such as
247
Just
regulating "the size of the ball or the shape of the goalposts."
because the issue at hand is sporting in nature does not remove the
issue from the scope of the treaty and EU law as a whole. 248 Ultimately,

the regulations at issue were struck down by the EU. 249
It is not a large step to take in arguing that FIFA's banishment of
TPO directly affects economic activity, prohibiting certain clubs not
only from purchasing certain players, but also from continuing to exist
entirely. While sporting in nature, similar actions taken by
international sporting bodies that infringe upon EU law have been
struck down in the past, just as certain doping regulations were struck

240. Id. ¶ 3'16.
241. Id. ¶ 3'15.
242. Id. 3'16.
243. Id. 3'17.
244. Id. ¶ 23.
245. Id. ¶ 24.
246. Id. ¶ 25.
247. Press Release, UEFA, Meca-Medina: A Step Backwards for the European
Sports Model and the Specificity of Sport? (Oct. 2, 2006) [hereinafter UEFA Press
Release] (directly quoting Gianni Infantino, then-Director Legal Affairs at UEFA and
now-FIFA President, located in an official UEFA document released soon after the MecaMedina ruling discussing Infantino's supposed fears that the EU will overstep their
boundaries and begin to regulate football).
248. Meca-Medina, 2006 E.C.R. TT 27-29.
249. See id.
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down in Meca-Medina.250 This direct effect on economic activity, the
transfer of money between clubs (both within Europe and throughout
the world) is exactly the type of limiting activity that has caused the
EU to step in throughout the past to overturn and forbid. To buttress
this idea, the CJEU in Meca-Medina stated that even if the sporting
activity at issue falls within the scope of an EU treaty, the conditions
for continuing such sporting activity are subject to every obligation
that may be required as a result of falling within the confines of said
treaty. 25 1 FIFA cannot evade EU law because it regulates sporting
interests; it is held to the same standards that any country, business,
or citizen is held to within the EU.
Following Bosman and Meca-Medina, the CJEU and EU
successfully created a judicial framework for the EU to serve as a
watchdog over European sporting bodies. Initiated in Bosman, the
CJEU established that certain sporting-body regulations can be
determined to be in opposition to EU law. 252 Shortly after, in MecaMedina, the CJEU again expanded its power over sports' regulating
bodies, this time taking an even larger step by asserting the primacy
of EU law over regulations of sports federations where they perturb
economic activity within the EU.2 5 3

3. Country-Specific Laws Conflicting with FIFA Regulations
While certain leagues implemented regulations regarding TPO up
until FIFA's worldwide banishment of the practice, other leagues have
been incapable of implementing such regulations due to their national
laws and customs. Certain national laws have prohibited national
sporting bodies of all types from impeding the free movement of capital
and persons.254

a. Austria
In a response to the CIES investigation of TPO for FIFA, the
Osterreichischer FuBball-Bund-the Austrian Football Associationstated that restrictions on TPO in Austria were nearly impossible. 255

250. See id.
251. See id. ¶ 28 ("It follows that the rules which govern that activity must
satisfy the requirements of those provisions, which, in particular, seek to ensure
freedom of movement for workers, freedom of establishment, freedom to provide
services, or competition.").
252. See Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Soci6tis de Football Ass'n ASBL
v. Jean-Marc Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-04921.
253. See generally Meca-Medina, 2006 E.C.R. 1-06991.
254. CIES REPORT, supra note 19, at 3-4.
255. See id. at 4 (reporting on the response of the Austrian Football Association
to questioning regarding the possibility of restricting third party ownership in their
nation's football leagues).
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The association explained "that overly severe restrictions of
contractual freedom might be deemed contrary to" Austrian law. 256
Austrian contract law, which governs any transfer or acquisition
of a football player within the country, reinforces the belief that
"freedom of contract is the underlying principle of Austrian contract
law."25 7 This freedom is absolute, and neither Austrian domestic law
nor international regulations can infringe on any term or agreement
within a contract. Further, business transactions in Austria are
"subject to either the contracting parties' terms and conditions and
Austrian law safeguards that such general terms pass a test of
fairness." 258

Any blanket ban of TPO could be seen as unfair and overly harsh
within Austrian borders. FIFA, after clearly being informed of
Austrian law and the potential for conflict if forms of ownership are
restricted internationally, ignored the potential for direct conflict with
national laws. 25 9 FIFA's ban could be construed as supplying illegal
avenues around Austrian contractual law, thus the ban is not entirely
enforceable within Austria's borders. 260
b. Brazil
While this Note has predominately focused on European law, as
the EU is the entity most likely to halt any regulations promulgated
by FIFA, Brazil has arguably been the country that is most adversely
affected by FIFA's TPO ban. Thus, a practical inquiry into why
Brazilian clubs stand so staunchly against FIFA's TPO ban is
warranted.
Brazil, and its league the Confederagdo Brasileira de Futebol
(CBF), has similar regulations to Austria, but instead of regulating
contractual law, its laws directly target TPO. 26 1 Again, this fact was
reported within the CIES report compiled at the behest of FIFA. 262 The
CBF stated that it considered TPO permissible by virtue of national
law, and that national law requires associations, their members, and
26 3
third parties to accept the practice of TPO.

256.

Id.

257.

RA Jokob Widner, Primeron Austrian Contract Law, ADVANTAGE AUSTRIA,

http://www.advantageaustria.org/international/zentralbusiness-guideoesterreichlimportieren-aus-oesterreichlinormen-und-recht/recht.en.htm1 (last visited
Dec. 2, 2018) [https://perma.cc/2XDW-TX8A] (archived Nov. 4, 2018).
258. Id. (emphasis added).
259. CIES REPORT, supra note 19, at 4; see Widner, supra note 257.
260. See Widner, supranote 257. The ban is not entirely enforceable within
Austrian borders due to the commanding contract law principle of freedom of contract.
The third-party ownership ban easily impinges upon the freedom of contract. Id.
261. CIES REPORT, supra note 19, at 4.
262. Id.
263. Id.
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While Austria's promotion of the freedom of contracts runs
counter to any ban on TPO, Brazil claims to legitimately safeguard the
process of TPO and forbids any impediment whatsoever upon the
practice. 264 Since the ban, the CBF has banned TPO to bring itself in
line with FIFA rules, yet clubs have not eliminated the practice
entirely; in 2016, for example, FIFA fined Santos Futebol Clube, a
prominent Brazilian football club, for breaching TPO regulations. 265
While the CBF was the first football federation in the world to adopt
the exact wording of FIFA's Article 18ter and ban the practice of TPO,
it is still in complete juxtaposition to Brazilian law to have
promulgated such regulation. 266
As of January 2019, no research or reporting can be found
regarding whether or not FIFA's regulatory scheme has been
challenged in Brazilian courts. If such action is brought, it could very
well be held that FIFA's regulations-and by extension CBFs adoption
of similar regulatory language-are contrary to Brazilian law.
Brazilian opposition to the ban can be found rather easily: Rafael
Botelho, the director of legal and corporate affairs for Traffic Sports
Marketing in Brazil, stated, following FIFA's ban, that "in legal terms,
it's impossible for FIFA to say what" football clubs "can or cannot do in
Brazil." 2 67 He went on to state that the country treats "the assignment
of economic rights of the players as a regular assignment of credit that
is ruled by Brazilian civil law." 268 While the CBF was required to come

into compliance with FIFA's articles banning TPO, legal challenges
could prove successful in restoring the legality of the practice within
Brazil. 269
It's clear from these responses that FIFA could easily overstep its
bounds in restricting TPO and subject some of its member nations to
severe legal penalties by doing so. This is but another reason for FIFA
to refrain from a worldwide restriction of the practice. FIFA itself does
not seem to care if it oversteps the bounds of national law; if it did, it
would at least make the most miniscule of efforts to tailor exceptions

264. See id.
265. Andrew Downie, Brazil bans third party ownership in line with FIFA rules,
REUTERS (Jan. 13, 2015), https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-soccer-brazilownership/brazil-bans-third-party-ownership-in-line-with-fifa-rulesidUKKBNOKM2EY20150113 [https://perma.ccl6M89-KBUTN] (archived Nov. 4, 2018);
see Wilson, supra note 35.
266. Marcos Motta & Pedro Fida, The FIFA ban on TPO in Brazil and the
Maidana Case, WORLD SPORTS LAW REP. (Nov. 2015),
http://www.bicharaemotta.com.br/wp-content/uploads/2015/1 1/TPO-in-Brazil-MaidanaCase-Pedro-Fida-and-Marcos-Motta-November-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/QE6RUD4N] (archived Nov. 4, 2018).
267. Liviu Bird, FIFA's third-partyownership crusade has major implications in
S. America, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 29, 2014), https://www.si.comlsoccer/planetfutbol/2014/10/29/third-party-ownership-fifa-brazil-south-america
[https://perma.ccl9EYC-MUQ3] (archived Nov. 4, 2018).
268. Id.
269. See id.
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to fit the many different competing legal structures evident throughout
the entirety of Europe.
4. Article 65 of the TFEU
Article 65 of the TFEU reinforces the provisions contained within
Article 63, those relating to the free movement of capital throughout
the EU and elsewhere. 270 Article 65, paragraph 1, clause (b) adds to
Article 63 that member states are permitted to take "all requisite
measures to prevent infringements of national law and regulations.""2 7
Thus, Austria as a member state currently possesses the right to
aggressively fight against FIFA's ban of TPO, a direct infringement on
Austria's contractual freedom. 2 72

Through the employment of Article 65, member states of the EUsuch as Austria-that determine TPO prohibitions run counter to their
national laws should have the right to bring legal action against FIFA
to invalidate regulations contrary to that nation's public policy or
security.
5. Article 154 of the TFEU
As previously mentioned, Article 63, pertaining to the free
movement of capital throughout member states of the EU as well as
non-EU countries, can be construed to directly implicate FIFA's TPO
ban as illegal throughout Europe.2 7 3 While it may seem unorthodox for
a governing entity such as the EU to regulate affairs of an
international organization that is not actually headquartered within
an EU member state, such as FIFA, Article 154 of the TFEU provides
a sweeping grant of labor-promotion tactics to the EU when foreign
policies directly affect member states. 2 74 Article 154 states that the EU
"shall have the task of promoting the consultation of management and
labour at Union level and shall take any relevant measure to facilitate
their dialogue by ensuring balance support for the parties."27 5 The
clause immediately following states that "the Commission shall consult
management and labour on the possible direction of Union action"specifying that the EU shall negotiate and discuss actions taken by

270. TFEU, supra note 168, arts. 63, 65.
271. Id. art. 65.
272. See Widner, supra note 257.
273. See TFEU, supra note 168, art. 63. By construing Article 63 strictly, it is
clear that all restrictions on the movement of capital within the EU are forbidden, and
FIFA's ban clearly infringes on the movement of capital in a number of ways. For
example, the ban may not permit certain players to move from team-to-team without
third party financing. Id.
274. See id. art 154.
275. Id.

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

218

[voL. 52:179

organizations residing within member states or third-party nations if
their mandates run counter to EU principles or articles.2 7 6
Article 154 has already been applied in such a way as to lead the
EU and European footballing bodies to work together.2 7 7 In July of
2008, the EU created a committee of social dialogue in the field of
football, preceded by the Bosman decision-discussed aboveencouraging clubs, federations, and other governing bodies throughout
Europe to work in cooperation with the EU and players'
representatives.2 7 8 These discussions eventually led to a resolution
between the EU and UEFA as to player contracts and standard terms
and requirements in such contracts. 279
Article 154 can be construed so as to warrant direct action and
involvement by the EU into FIFA's regulation of TPO. Additionally,
several other EU articles and previous CJEU decisions, described
above, can be read as to frustrate the legality of FIFA's worldwide TPO
ban. Potentially, this frustration is to such an extent as to warrant, or
even mandate, legal action by EU entities, or at the least, a corrective
investigation by FIFA. The omnidirectional tensions that FIFA's
previous attempts at regulating TPO have caused prove that the status
quo FIFA has created is untenable. Interested participants must find
a prudent mechanism to deal with the dilemmas the TPO ban has
already created, such as legal action or corrective investigations. Such
legal action or corrective investigation could open a line of dialogue
between the EU and FIFA, which may ultimately result in a solution
similar to the one proposed below.

IV. SOLUTION

The problem FIFA has created for itself, potentially opening the
entire entity to EU scrutiny, can be easily fixed. A simple revision of
the three articles FIFA passed to phase out TPO could rectify many of
FIFA's problems. Such revisions, proposed below, would permit FIFA
to come into compliance with the many articles and EU precedents
with which current FIFA regulations do not currently. 280
As previously stated, FIFA failed to discriminate between
different types of TPO that exist throughout the market. 281 FIFA
blatantly ignored vital information available to it by refusing to

276.
277.

Id.
See KEA-CDES, supra note 108, at 90.

278. Id.
279. Id.
280. TFEU, supra note 168, arts. 63, 65, 154. See generally Case C-519/04, David
Meca-Medina & Igor Majcen v. Comm'n of the European Cmty., 2006 E.C.R. I-06991;
Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Soci~tbs de Football Ass'n ASBL v. Jean-Marc
Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-04921.
281. KPMG, supra note 10, at 13.
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discriminate between the many different forms of TPO.28 2 Instead of
relying on information at its fingertips, such as the KPMG report
containing a plethora of research relating to TPO and its usage
worldwide, FIFA wiped its hands of the entire practice, rather than
parsing through the intricacies that certainly helped struggling clubs
survive. 28 3 KPMG published its report in 2013, yet FIFA did not even
announce its ban until 2014, providing sufficient time to complete such
a review. 284
A full cost-benefit analysis would have led the governing body to
discover that clubs in dire need of financial assistance could be
protected through the use of TPO. 285 Thus, the solution this Note
proposes will make that distinction for FIFA, advocating that
financing-TPO structures should not only be permitted, but would be
in compliance with the EU's current regulations. Aside from splitting
the difference for FIFA, this Note also pioposes a stringent regulatory
structure to accompany the revival of TPO structures throughout the
EU and hopefully the world.
A. Investment and FinancingTPO Refresher
The main difference between the two predominant TPO vehicles
is that financing-TPO transactions are employed to supplement a
specific financial need of a club, while investment-TPO transactions
take place when a club is satisfying a want (by buying a new player),
6
not necessarily satisfying a fiscal necessity. 28
Investment TPOs involve the acquisition of a new player by a club,
while a percentage of the economic rights of the purchased player are
simultaneously acquired by a third-party investor. 28 7 A financing TPO
operates slightly differently, wherein a club sells a portion of the
economic rights of a player currently owned, and the club receives the
full, lump-sum amount paid by the third party. This type of structure
would only be permitted when a club is in fiscal necessity, such as a
lack of liquidity to meet payroll demands, to pay for stadium
operations, to cover travel expenses for the club, or any other monetary
demands the operation of a club requires.28 8 In complete juxtaposition,
an investment TPO is used when a club wants to purchase a player
currently owned by another club, but cannot afford the full fee for such
player; in other words, the acquiring club is overextending itself in
player.2 89
new
a
in
bring
to
order
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The rationale in choosing to embrace a financing-TPO permitted
regime at the expense of exiling the investment-TPO vehicle is simple:
an investment TPO is a joint venture, where the club takes on a duty
of good faith to the investor, while within the financing TPO the
rationale for purchasing a player's rights is much simpler-to ensure
the continued existence of the club. 290 Within the investment TPO, the
club must honor the "commitment of transferring the player when an
29
In complete contrast, within the financing
important offer arrives."e
TPO, several factors are taken into account to value the investment,
the principal one being the financial needs of the club at the time the
TPO agreement is signed. 292 Thus, financing-TPO structures would
seem to eliminate many of the factors that FIFA dislikes about TPO
structures in general-the fact that investment-TPO structures seem
to require or force a club to transfer a player when a lucrative offer is
made by another club, taking the ultimate decision out of the hands of
the club. 293

The benefits of the financing TPO should be those that are
embraced by FIFA, not shunned. The duration of the relationship
between club and third party lasts only as long as the employment
contract lasts, thus there is a certain finality associated with the
financing TPO. 29 4 This finality is important. Conversely, an
investment-TPO arrangement could last forever, until the player is
actually sold to another club.29 5 In short, not only does the financingTPO format permit a club to prolong its future while improving its
financial position, but it also may keep the third-party owner's opinion
out of any future transactions, a type of corruption FIFA was wary
about when promulgating its initial ban. 296

In summary, the drawbacks FIFA hoped to avoid by banning TPO
arrangements-conflicts of interest, moral dilemmas associated with
owning a player (which has been likened to a type of modern slavery),
and circumvention of UEFA's financial fair play rules-can all be
avoided by embracing a discriminatory TPO approach.29 7 These
concerns will be addressed within the following subpart, which will
propose a new regulatory system for FIFA that would avoid the pitfalls
that have been described above.
B. Solution: A New Regulatory Structure
A narrowed regulatory structure, which would serve as a groundfloor level of regulation for all national footballing associations, could

290. MOURAO-FERREIRA, supra note 32, at 13-14.
291. Id. at 13.
292. Id. at 13-14.
293. See id. at 13.
294. See id. at 4.
295. See id.
296. FIFA Circular, supra note 137.
297. Van Maren et al., supra note 12, at 234; What is third-party ownership,
supranote 58.

2019]

THIRD-PARTY OWNERSHIP

221

easily be reconciled with the drawbacks FIFA hoped to eliminate by
banning TPO in its entirety. This regulatory structure would need to
possess a few common traits to achieve the desired result: a limitation
on the total percentage a third-party investor may own in a player, a
finality or termination to the agreement upon a concrete date in the
future, and a transparency requirement wherein the team is required
to report the third-party transaction to all major footballing entities
within an international registry system. These, among a few other
small terms, would permit FIFA to authorize a limited TPO structure,
one that is more related to stimulating the financial books of a club
instead of lining the pockets of an outside investor.
First, FIFA must finally address and differentiate between
financing-TPO and investment-TPO structures. FIFA should continue
to ban investment-TPO structures, as they permit too much outside
influence and allow a club to overextend itself, but should permit
financing-TPO structures because of their ability to save a struggling
football club while also benefitting every player on the squad in the
process.29 8 FIFA's mysterious disinterest in differentiating between
TPO types remains an open issue since it instituted its blanket ban,
and remains a silver lining of hope for those that advocate for the
process to continue. By permitting only financing-TPO structures,
FIFA would be advocating for the improved financial health of clubs
throughout the world, while condemning the overextension of a club's
financial resources that is evident through the employment of
investment-TPO schemes. There are a variety of ways FIFA might
create change that would remedy the issues previously considered
299
when FIFA originally banned the practice of TPO.

To rectify the conflict of interest issues between club and thirdparty owner, this new regulatory scheme would limit the maximum
ownership share a third party can hold in a player to less than or equal
to 49 percent. Also, this regulatory scheme would require boilerplate
terms in every TPO contractual agreement forbidding and limiting
decision-making powers possessed by the third party. They should
have no say in the decisions a club makes regarding the player. The
third party will play the role of the consummate silent party.3 00 The
third party must have no authority in regards to any personnel,
training, or administrative decisions concerning the player. FIFA's
initial concerns regarding conflict of interest could be mitigated
through requiring silence from a third party. Limiting the total amount
that a third party may own in a player would also limit the potential
for moral hazard. Limiting the total ownership to less than a majority
share would not change the way the player would be treated; no other
entity, other than the club the player is already owned by, would have
any say over that specific player's ownership decisions. If FIFA would

298. See MouRAo-FERREIRA, supra note 32, at 13-14.
299. Van Maren et al., supra note 12, at 234-35.
300. See supra Part II.A.2.
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continue to equate this style of ownership to "modern 'slavery,"' then it
should take steps to alter the common ownership structure it permits
now-there is no difference between one club owning a player entirely,
or still owning a controlling interest.3 0 1 Again, the third party will be
more akin to an investor purchasing a singular share of a company on
the stock market than a partner in a joint venture.
UEFA's concern that clubs will attempt to use TPO structures to
shirk or find an avenue around certain "Financial Fair Play rules"rules that attempt to limit the amount a club can spend in transfer fees
annually to level the spending playing field-can be easily remedied. 302
By mandating high initial barriers to entry for any TPO arrangement,
and requiring those barriers to be verified for every new third-party
arrangement a club attempts to enter, clubs would not be able to skirt
the rules easily. The point of differentiating between investment and
financing TPOs is to prevent clubs from overextending themselves
financially, and purchasing players they cannot afford for inflated
values that are financed by third parties. These potential barriers to
entry could vary league to league, continent to continent, or be strictly
enforced at the international level by FIFA. Examples of potential
minimum requirements that may be illustrative of the need to seek
TPO arrangements are as follows: providing club balance sheets that
illustrate the threat of a shortfall, providing salary/pay stubs for
players that prove the club would not be able to make payroll, or other
financial documents that illustrate need on behalf of the club. Before
any club could employ the use of a TPO structure, the club would need
to be approved as "financially unstable" by its national football
association as a club using such a technique for need-based purposes.
By employing a need-based system of entry, the goal of the TPO
arrangement would not be to shadily bypass rules, but to secure the
long-term existence of the club. This would not only benefit the club,
but also the player by allowing him to continue to improve his
performance and hone his skills with the club he is already established
and comfortable in. Also, a club's right to employ TPOs closes once the
club is in "stable financial order," to be determined on an annual basis
by the national football association. Once a club's finances have
recovered and it no longer needs TPOs in order to balance its books,
the club's right to offer third-party arrangements to outside investors
ceases. Any obligations from TPO arrangements currently in existence
are to continue as the contract itself states and terminate when the
player leaves the club.
All three of the main reasons for FIFA's ban-conflicts of interest,
moral dilemmas, and the evasion of rules-could be avoided by
requiring that clubs self-report existing contracts containing a TPO
structure within an international contract reporting system. FIFA

301.
302.

What is third-partyownership, supra note 58.
Van Maren et al., supra note 12, at 234.
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actually touched on a similar system within Circular No. 1464, the
document wherein FIFA announced its intent to promulgate
regulations to completely ban TPO.3 0 3 This system was meant to record
all agreements clubs had entered into with third parties "in their
specifying the
entirety, including possible annexes or amendments ...
details of the third party concerned, the full name of the player as well
as the duration of the agreement." 304 Employing a similar system upon
the reimplementation of TPO arrangements would permit FIFA or
UEFA-both levels at which would provide sufficient dual-level
oversight to regulate on a large scale-to keep a watchful eye over the
regrowth of TPO and avoid the recently mentioned pitfalls. These
bodies could determine if TPO arrangements are an attempt to evade
important rules, or if they cause a moral dilemma.
FIFA wants to avoid conflicts of interest; it does not want any
30 5
third party to have control over the footballing decisions of a club.
Any regulatory system proposed to replace FIFA's current ban must
embrace this ideal fully, but at the same time must provide some
financial incentive to third-party investors in order to attract them to
the investment venture in the first place. After all, if there is no chance
of an increased return value, there is no incentive to invest to begin
with. FIFA's concern over conflicts of interest would already be
addressed within this legal system by including contractual terms
forbidding third-party influence into the original agreement with the
third party. Constructing a system of returns to third-party investors
without reigniting those conflict of interest concerns is not as easy.
Thus, the regulatory system being proposed would contain a
termination period in the third-party agreement, limiting the total
amount of time that a third-party investor's interest in the player
exists. In essence, it would appear as a loan with contingencies: upon
a specific, negotiated event occurring, the third party would be paid
out. If such event does not occur, then the loan would lapse and the
borrowing club would be required to pay out the negotiated principaland potentially interest-agreed upon between participating parties at
the origination of the loan.
At the termination of such relationship, the club would pay back
the principal amount originally loaned to the club from the third party,
plus a negotiated percentage increase on top of that lump-sum amount.
The negotiated percentage would be an area of flexibility and creativity
for the club and third party, attracting outside investors to struggling
clubs seeking to raise capital through a financing-TPO arrangement.
Examples of negotiated terms could range from the point in time at
which the third party is paid back (either at the termination of the term
period or at the time of sale of the player under the third-party
agreement-whichever happens sooner), the percentage return the
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third party will receive and whether such amount would be based on
the riskiness of the club or the potential increase in player value over
the course of the loan, and ultimately the term of the loan-which FIFA
could cap as an extra regulatory structure. Lastly, third-party rights
would only attach to the current contract; if the player under contract
extends his contract then the club must settle up with the third party
for the required amount at termination or extend the third-party
agreement.
Finally, and most simply, clubs will only be permitted to sell the
economic rights of a player currently on their squad. This continues
the theme of what was originally permitted within TPO arrangements:
only economic rights of players can be sold through third-party
arrangements; federative rights may not be sold in any form. 306
C. How This System Rectifies Current FIFA Defects
A regulatory scheme similar to that proposed above would be in
compliance with CJEU precedent, namely the two precedents that
have heavy influenced FIFA regulations: Bosman and MecaMedina.3 07 Bosman and Meca-Medina do not directly implicate FIFA's
complete ban on TPO, but certainly begin to pave an avenue to
establish EU oversight over major actions taken by sports' regulatory
bodies.3 08 In Bosman, the CJEU found that UEFA regulations could
run counter to certain EU articles, and that the EU could force sports'
regulatory bodies to comply with EU law.3 09 In Meca-Medina, the court
established the supremacy of EU law over sports' regulatory bodies'
regulations.3 1 0 These cases provide a substantial argument for the EU
to step in and halt FIFA's ban on the practice of TPO, because, as was
discussed within the previous Part, FIFA's ban runs counter to
multiple EU articles.3 1 1 That being said, the new regulatory scheme
being proposed is designed to comply with EU articles and does not
stymie the free movement of labor.
Such system is designed to comply with current EU law that FIFA
currently runs counter to with its complete ban on TPO tactics.31 2 If
FIFA permits a form of the financing TPO to exist, then it should align
closely enough to current EU legal strictures that the EU would defer
to FIFA's judgment as a sports' regulatory entity with substantial
expertise. Such inference Stems from the Bosman ruling, wherein the
CJEU stated their understanding that an organization with specific,

306. MOURAO-FERREIRA, supra note 32, at 4.
307. See generally Case C-519/04, David Meca-Medina & Igor Majcen v. Comm'n
of the European Cmty., 2006 E.C.R. 1-06991; Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des
Soci6tis de Football Ass'n ASBL v. Jean-Marc Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-04921.
308. See supra Part III.C.2.
309. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-04921.
310. Meca-Medina, 2006 E.C.R. 1-06991.
311. See supra Part III.C.
312. See supra Part IV.
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niche expertise can exhibit the best judgment over its own market
share.31 3 It can be assumed, through CJEU case law, that if FIFA were
to permit any small modicum of the practice of TPO, it could very easily
comply with EU law. 3 14
The new regulatory scheme would not completely inhibit the free
movement of labor, as opposed to FIFA's total ban on the practice,
because it would still permit players to move from team to team at their
or the team's own free will. FIFA's blanket ban inhibits the movement
of labor throughout the EU, and with Bosman, the EU opened the door
to regulating sports entities of "considerable social importance."3 15
This new regulatory system will not preclude players from moving from
club to club or limit the free movement of labor, as it requires that TPO
schemes terminate or be paid out when a player's contract expires or a
player moves to a different club. Meca-Medina provides even greater
support for a new regulatory regime, as the CJEU determined that EU
law reigned supreme over sports federations and that the court could
regulate questions of sporting interest that relate to economic
activity.3 1 6 FIFA's ban clearly impacts economic activity and should
attract the EU's scrutiny; specifically, FIFA's ban inhibits the transfer
of money between clubs throughout Europe and intercontinentally.
The new regulatory system would not cause such impediments to
the movement of capital. While a full ban of TPO completely halts
economic flow, a partial ban may stimulate and continue the flow of
capital and labor throughout the EU. The sales of players' ownership
rights would only be permitted for currently owned players, not for the
acquisition of new players. This would allow capital to move at a high
velocity, as quickly as a third party became interested in investing
within a team. As has been previously discussed, a sports' regulatory
body can in fact regulate the specifics of its sport, as it is an expert
within that market share.31 7 As long as FIFA does not completely
inhibit the free movement of labor, the EU should defer to FIFA's
expertise and permit this new and improved version of TPO.
The 2001 Agreement provides a clear illustration of previous
cooperation between UEFA, FIFA, and the EU.31 s The solidarity
mechanism it provides is important, showing the EU's commitment to
spreading wealth throughout the continent.3 19 This mechanism
provides a good example of FIFA permitting the division of transfer
fees between parties in the past, as would be necessary with the new
regulatory regime. 320 This discriminatory regime would avoid the
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harms FIFA had targeted in its original ban of the practicecorruption-while still allowing teams to participate in a watereddown TPO regime. Terms such as autonomous negotiations with the
club, repayment clauses, and opportunities for profit, as well as
indemnity clauses would create a regime where TPO is not only
permitted, but complies with EU law while keeping FIFA happy.
A regime supporting financing TPOs also supports the free
movement of players required by Article 63 of the TFEU.32 1 Not only
would capital flow freely through member states, but players would be
permitted to move from team to team at their own free will since thirdparty owners would be legally forbidden from exerting any influence
over their decisions. Players could pursue their own goals, seek out new
opportunities, and gain the vital experiences that all football players
yearn for throughout their careers. The new regime of TPO would
stimulate investments into football, a goal that the EU would surely be
happy to see the sport achieve. 32 2 This stimulating effect would come
directly from the potential allowance of TPO mechanisms, something
that would surely excite investors throughout the entire EU.
Article 65 of the TFEU permits member states that determine
that corporate regulations run counter to their national laws to bring
legal action against such corporations to invalidate rules that are
illegal within their borders. 32 3 Austrian contract law, for example,
reinforces the belief that "freedom of contract is the underlying
principle of Austrian contract law." 324 The new regime of TPO proposed

would not impinge upon this freedom of contract, as it would still
permit the practice of TPO to occur. The new regime will merely limit
a specific subset of the practice, not the entire practice generally-not
an entire form of contractual law as FIFA currently bans.
Finally, Article 154 of the TFEU provides a sweeping grant of
labor promotion tactics to the EU to regulate affairs of an international
organization such as FIFA that affects business within EU borders.
Hopefully, the EU will notice that there are alternative avenues to a
TPO regulatory regime and advocate for changes in FIFA's regulatory
scheme to help stimulate the movement of labor and capital
throughout the EU-two major concerns within the TFEU.3 2 5

This new regulatory regime permitting TPO should help remedy
many of the legal concerns that FIFA's current ban has created. While
it may be impossible to regulate the entire practice and comply with
every EU regulation, the EU has shown a willingness to act deferential
toward entities that are experts within their fields or are capable of

321. See TFEU, supra note 168, art. 63.
322. See id. (considering the goal of the Article is to limit restrictions on the flow
of capital between member states and third countries, this allowance by FIFA would
surely stimulate some of those goals).
323. Id. art. 65.
324. Widner, supra note 257.
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controlling their market share. 326 While FIFA has shown it is more
than capable of controlling its own market share, it has shown great
apathy, or maybe even ignorance, toward flouting current EU
regulations. While the proposed regulatory regime may not be perfect,
any open dialogue with the EU would help to craft a successful and
legal new regulatory regime. Hopefully this proposal can help to
initiate some form of constructive dialogue between the two powerful
entities.

V. CONCLUSION

Sadly, this exercise will likely prove to be academic; FIFA has
stood as a corrupt organization for years and will only attempt to
change or lift the ban if it can in some way profit.3 2 7 Understanding
why TPO came into existence is important to understanding why
FIFA's ban is not only illegal, but completely unwarranted: stimulating
the ability for soccer players to grow from improved opportunities on
and off the pitch, as well as the ability for clubs to grow or improve
their financial position through the use of financing TPOs. Regulation
of such activities is warranted, although not to the extent FIFA decided
was necessary. FIFA's complete ban of TPO was propped up on reports
that provided insubstantial conclusions that did not completely
connect to the ultimately aggressive FIFA regulations. 328 It is apparent
from the study of the development of TPO regimes, and an
understanding of how clubs and players improved from usage of the
practice, why it is a concern that TPO has been banned
32 9

internationally.

Following a thorough analysis of applicable EU law and CJEU
precedents, it is apparent that the EU could form a strong case to exert
its authority over FIFA and other football regulatory bodies
throughout Europe. 330 Both the Bosman and Meca Medina
transactions paint a clear picture of the EU's willingness to intrude
upon nongovernmental regulatory associations that conduct business
within EU member states' borders.3 3 1 Thus, the EU should not hesitate
in at least beginning to investigate FIFA's reasoning for banning the

326. See generally Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Soci~tis de Football
Ass'n ASBL v. Jean-Marc Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-04921 (finding that if a sport's
regulatory body regulations infringe EU law, the EU can halt such regulations and
force compliance).
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practice. The multiple EU articles that FIFA's ban could be construed
to run counter to-for example, inhibiting the freedom of movement of
labor and the freedom of movement of capital-could serve as reason
enough to at least temper the ban's broad reach throughout the EU. 332
Beyond those two basic tenets of EU law, the 2001 Agreement between
FIFA, UEFA, and the EU illustrates a prime example of how the EU
has already stepped in to regulate the activities of major footballing
entities. It is likely that FIFA promulgated its regulations in complete
ignorance of their effect on EU law. Hopefully this Note will lead to
further inquiry on the subject by EU-based scholars or barristers.
Finally, the new TPO regulatory regime proposed within this Note
would attempt to remedy.the defects that FIFA's incongruous ban has
created.3 3 3 While no sort of regulatory system may align with some of
the EU's more stringent articles, the CJEU, and by extension the EU,
has shown a willingness to defer to certain regulatory entities'
structures when those entities possess the requisite expertise and a
large market share. 3 34
With all of this being said, the new regulatory system described
above may not be the best or only answer to solve FIFA's regulatory
headache. What is apparent is that the current regime should not
continue in perpetuity, and if legally challenged it may crumble.
Optimistically, this Note may serve as a warning shot across the bow
of FIFA's unbridled power, and ultimately lead to some form of
regulatory change. This change may even assist clubs struggling
financially to employ TPO arrangements to improve their long-term
stability. Any withdrawals and changes to FIFA's complete ban on the
practice of TPO would benefit clubs, leagues, and players from all
around the world. To reestablish joga bonito, one thing is certain:
action must be taken to push back against FIFA's complete ban of TPO.
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